The Law Apprenticeship Scam

“It’s a cruel hoax. It’s such a waste of time for someone to spend three years in this program but not have anything at the end.”

So says Robert E. Glenn, president of the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners. No, Glenn wasn’t talking about Liberty University’s 34.4 percent employment rate in full-time, long-term, bar-passage-required jobs for its class of 2013, which had an average debt level of $81,045 (only!). Rather he was referring to the low bar-passage rates of Virginia’s law readers, who along with their peers in other states are the subject of a New York Times article, “The Lawyer’s Apprentice.”

Citing data from the National Conference of Bar Examiners, which the Times deserves credit for researching, we learn that only 28 percent of apprentices passed the bar versus 73 percent of ABA law school graduates. This fact prompts the ABA’s Barry Courrier to declare:

“The A.B.A. takes the position that the most appropriate process for becoming a lawyer should include obtaining a J.D. degree from a law school approved by the A.B.A. and passing a bar examination,”

I find this response disappointing for a few reasons: One, even if these statistics are for first-time test-takers only, a 73 percent pass rate is lousy. Law schools should be held to higher standards for what they charge students.

Two, the article appears to tacitly accept the ABA’s position that we can’t have good lawyers without many years of law school (and probably college too). The elephant in this room is selection bias. The reason people go to law school rather than these apprenticeship programs is that law schools broker jobs to people who already do well on standardized tests, to wit, the LSAT. Certainly in the age of PAYE, someone who can crush the LSAT has much better odds of finding a good law job by going to law school than trying to find a lawyer who will train him or her. If anything, law school is a more reliable path to qualifying for the bar exam. Indeed, the article acknowledges that “the lack of class rankings put clerkships with judges and plum gigs at big firms out of reach” for law readers.

If you’re wondering why people who don’t do well on the LSAT go to law school instead of these programs, I give three responses. One, they aren’t widely known and have no advertising. Two, many law students still buy into the versatile JD myth. Three, the largest proportion of people opting out of law school are people who don’t do amazingly on the LSAT anyway. So there. (The Times says these programs are “underpopulated,” but given the effort the would-be apprentices must go through to get established, one might think the problem is that there really isn’t much demand for new lawyers.)

I acknowledge that many of the apprentices interviewed in the article are sincere in their desire to avoid debt and only want to do small practice work. If anything, bar authorities should make it easier for people to choose that route. Instead they offer a post hoc rationalization for credentialism in legal education.

Inside the (Alaska) Law School Scam?

Sorry, that should be “the Alaska Law School, In God We Trust,” which appears to have been founded by an attorney in Palm Springs, Calif.

If you throw http://www.thealaskalawschool.com into your browser you’ll be treated to what’s either a scam, a transparent hoax, or a genuine law school whose Web site does not leave readers believing that it’s sincere. What you will find for sure, though, is something that concerned the Alaska Bar Association so much that its bar counsel asked the ABA Section of Legal Education if it was legit (pdf). From where I’m sitting, it appears the Alaska Law School, In God We Trust is misrepresenting its application for ABA accreditation and its students’ eligibility for federal loan dollars.

Speaking of which, tuition for in-state students will be $43,000, including books. What a deal!

01 The Alaska Law School, In God We Trust

If the Alaska Law School, In God We Trust is real, however, incoming law students will be treated to a unique learning environment: two boats the school received as an anonymous donation!

02 The Alaska Law School, In God We Trust

Who doesn’t want to attend a law school featuring a global law library of Alexandrian proportions? (Don’t knock it. These folks know their ancient history.)

I think the rest speaks for itself.

Top 6 Underreported Changes to the ABA Accreditation Standards

(That should read “proposed” changes, but I wanted to keep this parody listicle under 71 characters.)

I’ve seen some of the reporting on the changes to the ABA’s accreditation standards that the Council of the Section of Legal Education proposed on June 6. The ABA’s House of Delegates will decide on them in August; you can read here about the intricate procedural shenanigans that ensue if the house chooses not to concur with the council.

That page also contains the link to the pdf of the revised standards, which I read through, and frankly I think others commenting on the proposed changes should have as well, for there are some juicy nuggets there that have gone unreported and underreported. Just about all of the coverage has been on two topics: (a) the council’s decision to disallow course credit for paid externships, and (b) the rule allowing up to 10 percent of a law school’s entering class to forgo the LSAT under certain circumstances. I have nothing to add about the paid externship rule, but the LSAT requirement will be number one on the list. So…

(1)  The 10 percent LSAT rule is not open ended.

Really, this topic was badly underreported, and anyone who didn’t read the actual proposed change was led to believe that law schools would be able to admit up to 10 percent of a class without an LSAT score for just about any reason whatsoever. Not even close. The new Interpretation 503-3 only allows applicants to forgo the LSAT if either (a) they’re undergraduates at the same institution to which they’re applying to law school, or (b) they’re seeking a dual-degree at that institution. The benefits will go primarily to law schools putting together 4-2/3-3/3-2 (for masochists) undergrad-J.D. programs and those touting their dual-degree offerings.

Even then, applicants in both circumstances must still take a standardized test. They must have scored in the 85th percentile or higher on the ACT or SAT if they’re undergrads at the same institution. If they’re seeking a dual-degree, they must have scored at the 85th percentile or higher in the GMAT or GRE. No one gets into law school without taking a standardized test and doing very well on it. Applicants must also have either ranked in the top 10 percent of their undergraduate classes “through” six semesters (I’m unsure if this means six semesters total or six consecutive semesters) or achieved a cumulative GPA of 3.5 or greater.

Bottom line: Very few applicants will benefit from this interpretation, and in no way is it watering down the aptitude requirement because only very sharp people will be able to use it. If anything, I doubt even those who are qualified would even know about it. At best it excuses a bunch of would-be elite law school students who would’ve crushed the LSAT anyway.

(2)  Death to the full-time faculty calculation!

Interpretations 402-1 and 402-2, which set out the convoluted rules for calculating full-time-equivalent faculty has been crossed out. No longer shall full-time legal writing instructors be treated as seven-tenths of a full-time teacher.

(3)  Goodbye dusty reporters in the library…

Standard 606 and Interpretation 606-2 have added the language “reliable access” to describe the “core collection” law school libraries must provide their students. “Reliable access” can include subscription and publicly available databases as well as “formal resource-sharing arrangements.” Anyone talking about onerous library requirements will have nothing to complain about now. (Okay, maybe less.)

(4)  …And hello office-sharing for professors.

Yup, Standard 702(3) (now 702(4)) has been modified from “an office for each full-time faculty member” to “office space for full-time faculty members.” Now deans can retaliate against petulant faculty by making them share offices with their ill-mannered colleagues.

(5)  No more taxation without documentation.

The new Standard 202(b) requires law schools that are attached to parent universities to obtain an annual “accounting and explanation for all charges and costs assessed against resources generated by the law school and for any use of resources generated by the law school to support non-law school activities and central university services.” Those of you with longish memories remember in 2011 when the University of Baltimore ousted its law school’s dean, Phillip Closius, allegedly for disclosing that the parent university confiscated all but $81,000 out of a $1.4 million tuition hike. After the ABA’s regular inspection, it asked for (read: demanded) such an accounting by the parent university. If this standard goes into effect—and this one absolutely certainly will—a lot of universities will have to confess the extent to which they’ve been looting their law schools. This might lead to more awkward conversations between ABA accreditors and university administrators. Who knows, maybe students will get more of their money’s worth or even a tuition cut?

(6)  Dishonor before death?

In a cryptic pair of new standards, 202(c) and 202(d), law schools will be deemed not in compliance with the standards if their “current financial conditions” and even their “anticipated financial conditions” (whatever that means) has—or is reasonably expected to have—”a negative and material effect on the law school’s ability to operate in compliance with the standards or to carry out its program of legal education.” 202(c) is a modified version of Interpretation 201-1, but 202(d), the “anticipated financial condition” appears new but ported from the original 201(a).

I’m not sure what conditions would trigger a non-compliance situation due to anticipated financial problems, or its consequences, so I don’t know what this means or how it’d be enforced. I include it because law schools are in tough times, so I can imagine a central university shutting down its law school if it reasonably believes it won’t be in compliance with the standards in the future. I seriously doubt a law school would lose its accreditation due to anticipated financial reasons before being shut down.

This concludes the listicle. Take care folks.

Japan’s Legal Profession Doesn’t Need Law Schools

…Is really all I have to say in response to the May 30th Yomiuri Shinbun editorial titled, “Law School Reform Urgently Needed, Essential for Profession’s Future.” I discussed the striking data underlying this topic last week. The newspaper that owns the indomitable the Tokyo Giants baseball team writes:

The primary cause of this situation [people qualifying for the bar exam by taking the preliminary test rather than blowing ~$16,000-$45,000 on two to three years of law school] lies in the fact that law schools have failed to perform their function of nurturing the legal profession.

Launched in 2004, law schools aim to foster work-ready legal professionals. Therefore, their curricula emphasize practical business skills, and essentially exclude preparation for the bar exam. The result is low pass rates. It could be said that law schools fail to fulfill the original purpose for their establishment.

It is, of course, necessary to cultivate practical business capabilities. But, first and foremost, it is essential to help students acquire the abilities needed to pass the bar exam. Reconsideration of curricula is essential in this regard.

What nonsense. Prospective lawyers are behaving rationally. If it’s less risky to take the preliminary test than be nurtured into a “work-ready legal professional” at law school at their cost, then that’s what people will do. The fact that the bar exam is the necessary condition to becoming a lawyer in Japan means that the law schools’ purpose is frivolous. If the state thinks the exam is more important than learning professionalism or whatever, then concerned newspapers should be lobbying to either change the test to cover practical skills or reduce its impact altogether. It sounds to me like Japan’s legal profession’s future doesn’t need law schools. The government’s failed policy has pretty much said as much.

Law School Applicant Collapse: Japan Edition

Readers might recall last month when UC-Irvine’s law school defenders took to The New York Times‘ op-ed pages and told us that America’s legal education is so amazing that even Japan was emulating it. Well, The Yomiuri Shinbun tells us how that experiment turned out:

Number of Law School Applicants (Japan)

Ouch. In 2007, law schools received more than 40,000 applicants, but this year they’ve managed to haul in 11,450. Most of the applicant collapse is due to news getting out about graduates’ low bar passage rates. And all this without any scamblogs! (to my knowledge)

Apparently Japan created a “preliminary test” in 2011 as an alternative to law school, and this year it beat out regular schooling to the alarm of some officials who now want to limit the number of people who can take the test. Good luck with that. It’s time to admit the Americanization of legal education didn’t work and shut the schools down.

Scalia on Law School Sustainability: Concur and Dissent

…Is up on The American Lawyer.

Speaking of Financing Legal Education…

So the ABA has promptly acted on the Task Force on the Future of Legal Education’s recommendation to convene a new task force to investigate the financing of legal education. I think the stakes for this task force are going to be higher than for the previous one because its focus is more specific and it will have to address concrete questions like what impact the federal loan program has on law school costs. Its mission?

The task force is charged with looking at the cost of legal education for students, the financing of law schools, student loans and educational debt. It will also consider current practices of law schools regarding the use of merit scholarships, tuition discounting and need-based aid.

To commemorate the task force, here’s some info on tuition and discounting from the Official Guide for the 2012-13 academic year, the most recent one for which data are available. Notably, the average private law school lost many students who were paying full tuition.

Mean No. Full-Time Private Law School Students by Grant Received

This translated into a sudden loss of $215 million in revenue from full-time students for private law schools, which comes to about $1.9 million per school on average.

Aggregate Revenue From Full-Time Private Law School Students Paying Full-Tuition

As a result, the percentage of full-time students paying full tuition at the average private law school fell below 44 percent, a loss of about 10 percentage points since 2001. Public law schools follow the same trend.

Percent Full-Time Law Students Paying Full Tuition

Increasingly, the stated tuition price is not indicative of what the first year of legal education really costs.

That’s all for now.

********************

[Updated for comments below, here are the first two charts with lines excluding the top 20 private law schools by U.S. News ranking.

Mean No. Full-Time Private Law School Students by Grant Received Aggregrate Revenue From Full-Time Private Law School Students Paying Full TuitionThe decline in students receiving no grants is slightly steeper when you exclude the top 20 (~-3%). Same goes for aggregate revenue from full-time students paying full tuition.]

WSJ: Big Numbers Divided by Small Numbers Yield Large Percentages

The Wall Street Journal tells us that 1.63 million people are now on IBR, up from *gasp!* 1.32 million last quarter and (avert your eyes innocent readers!) 950,000 in the third quarter of 2013. That’s SEVENTY-TWO PERCENT GROWTH! HOLY COW! (Note: These figures are only for borrowers with Direct Loans. The actual figure is higher when you include guaranteed-loan borrowers.)

…Or it’s just what you’d expect to happen when you divide large numbers by small ones, especially when the government has been lamenting low IBR enrollment rates. Indeed, I recall way back in October 2012 when Inside Higher Ed dared to run an article titled, “An Underused Lifeline,” in which we learned that only 1.1 million borrowers had enrolled in IBR and 474,000 on ICR (clearly one of these two publications knows how the federal loan programs work better than the other).

Apparently, though, the world changed when I wasn’t looking, and now IBR and its friends are monstrous, out-of-control, “fastest-growing forms of financial assistance” because the Obama administration’s efforts to sign people up are working better than intended. Don’t tell the WSJ, but if you include Direct Loan borrowers on ICR, the total is 2.23 million borrowers. Another 850,000 are in “alternative” or “other” repayment plans, which will probably have the same effects as IBR/ICR/PAYE do on the budget. It’s all on ED’s Web site.

It’s like you can report on people signing up for IBR but not the PPACA exchanges.

Aside from mastering basic math skills, there are a few other points worth noting from the article:

(1). Treasury’s deputy secretary Sarah Bloom Raskin says seven million people are currently in default on their government student loans. There are currently 40 million federal loan borrowers, leading to an overall default rate of 17.5 percent. If you’re going to sensationalize the potential losses on IBR, you should be pointing out that the federal loan program has been a disastrous failure all along. Instead, the coverage appears to focus on how to “fix” IBR as in point (4) below.

(2). Thou shalt be specific in thy reportery:

The programs’ popularity comes as top law schools have taken to advertising their own plans that offer to cover a graduate’s federal loan repayments until outstanding debt is forgiven—opening the way for free or greatly subsidized degrees at taxpayer expense.

To my knowledge, only one “top law school” has advertised such plans. The WSJ should have been specific. Also, the story might be newsworthy in law school reporting, but overall, I consider it pretty minor. Georgetown University Law Center grads don’t number 2.23 million and not all of them are on IBR, ICR, etc.

(3). The motivations of the Obama administration:

The Obama administration has sought to boost enrollment in income-based repayment to reduce defaults, which have soared in recent years amid the weak labor market.

If I were cynical, I’d say Obama’s student loan policies are just a ploy to kick the student debt can down the road for his successors to deal with.

Also in case you’re thinking of tarring the Democrats by saying IBR is a handout to the 47 percent or whatever, recognize that it was enacted during the Bush administration.

(4). More Lucky Ducky Debtors:

The Obama administration, while touting the overall benefits of the programs, has voiced concerns that they could benefit some borrowers who need the help the least—namely lawyers and doctors making high incomes. The White House proposed in its budget earlier this year to limit the amount forgiven under the programs.

Has anyone bothered to calculate how many high-debt, high-income lawyers there are on IBR? What proportion are they of the total? How big would the losses be?

(5). …Which leads to the issue of the article’s tone. Consider the title, “Enrollment in Student-Debt Forgiveness Programs Soars in 2014.” IBR is not a “student-debt forgiveness program.” That’s a feature of IBR, not its primary purpose, which is to reduce monthly payments for struggling debtors. Thus, the title misleads readers because it implies that everyone who signs onto IBR will have their loans canceled.

Now, it’s true that the average IBR debt is about $55,000, that many debtors will probably never be able to repay their loans, and that taxpayers will probably have to accept a write-down on student loan debts. However, IBR just masks the student debt crisis. Without these programs, highly leveraged debtors would still be highly leveraged, and taxpayers would still have to cancel many bad student loans. IBR changes none of this other than rescuing people from debt servitude in exchange for tax liens on their incomes.

Despite the sudden hype, we have no idea what the dispersion is for IBR debts (and (future) incomes). It could be that a majority of the IBR debtors have small debts that will be paid off in fewer than 20 years. A bigger problem is the Grad PLUS Loan Program (another Bush-era invention), which is a blank check to the aforementioned lawyers and doctors, or, rather, their universities. Good reporting would have told readers this.

[Note: corrected typos.]

NYT Op-Ed Authors Ignore Bloat in Legal Education

…Is up on The American Lawyer.

Memo to law students who think their underemployed, indebted classmates are Lucky Duckies: THIS is how you write about legal education.

Which Law Schools Are Shedding Full-Time Professors (2013 Edition)?

I asked this question not even six months ago, but since the Official Guide‘s data are out already, I figured no harm’d be done revisiting it.

Followers of the law school applicant crash are likely to be interested in knowing which law schools are responding by letting go of faculty. Talk of buyouts is in the air, and tenured faculty are among the highest paid, making their departures relief to law schools’ budgets. The Official Guide can help illuminate where that’s going on. For the most part.

Unfortunately, some schools are more diligent about submitting their data than others. Also, it’s not uncommon for wide fluctuations to occur on a year-by-year basis or for downright absurd outcomes to occur, e.g. in 2011 when South Dakota reported only having a full-time faculty of one, which sounds like a Hollywood pitch. Property Prof Versus the Undead 1Ls would make a delightful zombie movie—and the gratuitous Blackacre jokes might even deter the hordes of applicants powered by Legally Blonde—but alas, it was certainly a data entry error.

Having said that, overall, the aggregate of the data probably tell a reliable story: Peak full-time law professor occurred in 2011, and by 2013 even part-time profs started to disappear. The bubble is slowly deflating.

Number of Faculty and Administrators by Type(Click to enlarge)

In fact, most of the full-time law prof bubble occurred in the 21st century. They had a good run, I guess. For a time, “law teachers, postsecondary” was one of the fastest-growing occupations in the country.

But I know what you really came here for: Rankings! These are sorted by net two-year reduction by school with the fewest number of full-time faculty in 2011, the idea being that a small school that reduces its professors by the same number as a larger one sees a bigger impact.

Behold! Your vile, execrable, perverted obsession indulged:

**********

FULL-TIME FACULTY (FALL)
RANK SCHOOL ’11 ’12 ’13 ANNUAL CHANGE NET CHANGE
1. Chicago 67 70 46 -24 -21
1. Florida Coastal 69 60 48 -12 -21
3. McGeorge 49 43 33 -10 -16
4. St. Louis 55 49 40 -9 -15
5. St. John’s 52 39 38 -1 -14
5. Hofstra 56 54 42 -12 -14
5. New York Law School 70 57 56 -1 -14
8. Widener 51 51 38 -13 -13
8. Catholic 52 43 39 -4 -13
8. Fordham 85 81 72 -9 -13
11. Hamline 34 26 22 -4 -12
11. California-Hastings 67 57 55 -2 -12
13. La Verne 19 8 8 0 -11
13. Roger Williams 27 20 16 -4 -11
13. Touro 36 34 25 -9 -11
13. Pace 48 41 37 -4 -11
13. John Marshall (Chicago) 69 69 58 -11 -11
18. William Mitchell 39 35 29 -6 -10
18. Wisconsin 57 54 47 -7 -10
18. Stetson 58 48 48 0 -10
18. California-Berkeley 65 63 55 -8 -10
18. Brooklyn 66 63 56 -7 -10
23. Golden Gate 36 30 27 -3 -9
23. Albany 44 40 35 -5 -9
23. Seton Hall 49 41 40 -1 -9
23. Loyola Marymount (CA) 67 65 58 -7 -9
27. Detroit Mercy 31 27 23 -4 -8
27. San Francisco 38 33 30 -3 -8
27. Georgia State 50 43 42 -1 -8
27. Seattle 61 57 53 -4 -8
31. New Hampshire 21 14 14 0 -7
31. Dayton 24 23 17 -6 -7
31. Capital 32 31 25 -6 -7
31. Wayne State 34 30 27 -3 -7
31. Cleveland State 36 32 29 -3 -7
31. California Western 42 38 35 -3 -7
31. Indiana (Bloomington) 55 50 48 -2 -7
31. Boston University 55 54 48 -6 -7
31. Virginia 85 79 78 -1 -7
40. Faulkner 19 14 13 -1 -6
40. Regent 23 18 17 -1 -6
40. Florida A&M 25 20 19 -1 -6
40. Vermont 29 27 23 -4 -6
40. Arizona 38 33 32 -1 -6
40. Thomas Jefferson 39 39 33 -6 -6
40. Wake Forest 41 38 35 -3 -6
40. Penn State 53 51 47 -4 -6
40. DePaul 54 50 48 -2 -6
40. Washington University 67 66 61 -5 -6
40. Miami 82 79 76 -3 -6
51. Toledo 28 25 23 -2 -5
51. Whittier 29 24 24 0 -5
51. Quinnipiac 29 26 24 -2 -5
51. Texas A&M 31 29 26 -3 -5
51. St. Thomas (FL) 37 33 32 -1 -5
51. Chapman 44 40 39 -1 -5
51. SUNY Buffalo 45 39 40 1 -5
51. Nova Southeastern 52 49 47 -2 -5
59. Ave Maria 19 19 15 -4 -4
59. Western New England 27 23 23 0 -4
59. Baylor 27 25 23 -2 -4
59. Missouri (Kansas City) 31 27 27 0 -4
59. Northeastern 36 37 32 -5 -4
59. New England 37 35 33 -2 -4
59. Pittsburgh 40 39 36 -3 -4
59. Southwestern 56 57 52 -5 -4
59. Santa Clara 61 56 57 1 -4
59. Texas 83 75 79 4 -4
59. George Washington 87 87 83 -4 -4
59. New York University 141 137 137 0 -4
71. Wyoming 17 15 14 -1 -3
71. Samford 23 22 20 -2 -3
71. Campbell 23 21 20 -1 -3
71. Widener (Harrisburg) 23 22 20 -2 -3
71. Southern Illinois 24 24 21 -3 -3
71. University of St. Thomas (MN) 30 29 27 -2 -3
71. Oregon 30 27 27 0 -3
71. Nevada 32 23 29 6 -3
71. Texas Southern 33 30 30 0 -3
71. Southern University 39 35 36 1 -3
71. Connecticut 41 38 38 0 -3
71. Notre Dame 49 54 46 -8 -3
71. Cornell 53 55 50 -5 -3
71. Florida, University of 61 62 58 -4 -3
71. Emory 63 64 60 -4 -3
71. Suffolk 70 66 67 1 -3
71. Michigan 70 71 67 -4 -3
88. Liberty 19 17 17 0 -2
88. District of Columbia 20 20 18 -2 -2
88. Kentucky 24 21 22 1 -2
88. Gonzaga 26 22 24 2 -2
88. Northern Kentucky 27 29 25 -4 -2
88. Oklahoma City 27 25 25 0 -2
88. California-Irvine 28 27 26 -1 -2
88. North Carolina Central 31 28 29 1 -2
88. Charleston 31 31 29 -2 -2
88. Cincinnati 32 32 30 -2 -2
88. West Virginia 34 34 32 -2 -2
88. Loyola (LA) 40 39 38 -1 -2
88. Case Western Reserve 41 41 39 -2 -2
88. Vanderbilt 41 38 39 1 -2
88. Southern California 45 46 43 -3 -2
88. Colorado 48 46 46 0 -2
88. Georgia 50 47 48 1 -2
88. Lewis and Clark 52 51 50 -1 -2
106. Western State 17 11 16 5 -1
106. Arkansas (Little Rock) 19 19 18 -1 -1
106. Howard 21 20 20 0 -1
106. Mississippi College 26 26 25 -1 -1
106. Tulsa 26 25 25 0 -1
106. Arkansas (Fayetteville) 27 23 26 3 -1
106. Hawaii 29 28 28 0 -1
106. Washburn 30 32 29 -3 -1
106. George Mason 34 35 33 -2 -1
106. Washington and Lee 35 35 34 -1 -1
106. Utah 37 36 36 0 -1
106. Marquette 37 37 36 -1 -1
106. Tulane 43 45 42 -3 -1
106. Maryland 61 61 60 -1 -1
106. Illinois Institute of Technology 64 63 63 0 -1
121. North Dakota 12 9 12 3 0
121. Northern Illinois 17 15 17 2 0
121. Willamette 25 25 25 0 0
121. Louisiana State 29 26 29 3 0
121. St. Mary’s 31 31 31 0 0
121. Barry 32 32 32 0 0
121. Texas Tech 32 35 32 -3 0
121. Oklahoma 33 31 33 2 0
121. Alabama 38 39 38 -1 0
121. John Marshall (Atlanta) 40 49 40 -9 0
121. Florida State 41 43 41 -2 0
121. Illinois 43 43 43 0 0
121. California-Davis 46 46 46 0 0
121. Arizona State 49 51 49 -2 0
121. Michigan State 51 51 51 0 0
121. Temple 58 55 58 3 0
137. Montana 14 14 15 1 1
137. Appalachian 15 17 16 -1 1
137. Ohio Northern 19 19 20 1 1
137. Creighton 23 25 24 -1 1
137. Louisville 25 25 26 1 1
137. Brigham Young 25 24 26 2 1
137. Drake 26 25 27 2 1
137. Akron 26 30 27 -3 1
137. Valparaiso 27 31 28 -3 1
137. Syracuse 41 45 42 -3 1
137. Indiana (Indianapolis) 42 8 43 35 1
137. Houston 51 55 52 -3 1
137. Duke 55 59 56 -3 1
137. Pennsylvania 62 65 63 -2 1
137. Northwestern 76 84 77 -7 1
137. American 102 103 103 0 1
137. Georgetown 130 140 131 -9 1
154. Memphis 18 18 20 2 2
154. Drexel 24 25 26 1 2
154. Mercer 26 27 28 1 2
154. Nebraska 27 29 29 0 2
154. Arizona Summit 32 41 34 -7 2
154. South Texas 44 47 46 -1 2
154. Baltimore 50 52 52 0 2
154. Boston College 52 49 54 5 2
154. Minnesota 53 51 55 4 2
163. Maine 16 16 19 3 3
163. Idaho 19 20 22 2 3
163. Kansas 28 30 31 1 3
163. Florida International 29 29 32 3 3
163. Villanova 32 31 35 4 3
163. South Carolina 33 37 36 -1 3
163. Southern Methodist 38 36 41 5 3
163. Washington 51 48 54 6 3
163. Stanford 59 60 62 2 3
172. Tennessee 27 28 31 3 4
172. Missouri (Columbia) 28 26 32 6 4
172. City University 34 39 38 -1 4
172. Iowa 39 43 43 0 4
172. Cardozo 58 62 62 0 4
172. Harvard 116 125 120 -5 4
178. Duquesne 23 27 28 1 5
178. New Mexico 28 29 33 4 5
178. Richmond 32 31 37 6 5
178. Rutgers (Newark) 34 38 39 1 5
178. Pepperdine 35 40 40 0 5
178. North Carolina 44 49 49 0 5
178. San Diego 55 47 60 13 5
185. Elon 17 19 23 4 6
185. Ohio State 38 45 44 -1 6
187. Loyola (IL) 48 48 55 7 7
187. California-Los Angeles 72 76 79 3 7
189. Rutgers (Camden) 45 48 53 5 8
190. Yale 61 71 70 -1 9
191. William and Mary 39 38 49 11 10
192. South Dakota 1 15 14 -1 13
192. Mississippi 17 28 30 2 13
192. Denver 62 73 75 2 13
192. Thomas M. Cooley 102 96 115 19 13
196. Charlotte 39 62 64 2 25
196. Columbia 127 142 152 10 25
10TH PERCENTILE 21 19 19 0 -2
25TH PERCENTILE 27 26 26 0 -1
MEDIAN 38 37 35 -2 -3
75TH PERCENTILE 53 51 49 -2 -4
90TH PERCENTILE 67 66 63 -3 -4
MEAN 42.4 41.3 40.1 -1.2 -2.3
GROSS GAIN 221 276
GROSS DECLINE -421 -670
CUMULATIVE 8,352 8,158 7,958 -200 -394

Comments:

(1). I seriously doubt Chicago let go of a third of its faculty this year; its enrollments are about the same as ever, and there isn’t a corresponding surge in part-time profs or similar offsets. Either Chicago misreported this year or did so in previous years and is now correcting it.

(2). The rest of the large reductions happened at schools that you’d expect them to, except maybe Berkeley.

(3). Incidentally, it’s nice to see that Indiana-Indianapolis found the 35 profs it lost last year. Again, another misreporting.

(4). In November, I was incredulous of Columbia’s 15-prof binge, but it appears to be continuing. In the last two years Columbia has increased its full-time faculty by 20 percent. Maybe that’s where all the Chicago profs went?

That’s all for now. Peace.

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