Legal Education ROI

Class of 2016 NALP Data

Happy post-Labor Day. Now back to work, Peasants!

Or, read on.

A few weeks ago, the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) published the national summary report for its Employment Report and Salary Survey (ERSS) (pdf). As with the last two years, I comb the data for more information that the NALP may not have commented on. Much of the NALP report focuses on year-over-year changes to percentages of employed graduates that aren’t very illuminating, especially when the resulting percentages of employed graduates are barely budging. Here’s what they look like.

I’m aware that we now have three consecutive years of data showing graduate employment outcomes ten months after graduation rather than nine, but I really don’t think that makes much of a difference.

It appears that the percentage of graduates not working fell a whopping 0.8 percent. Whoa.

Here’s also the number of graduates employed by status.

We’re seeing a pretty steep fall in total graduates, but the number and proportion of them not working is still higher than the peak employment year of 2007. A lot of this is elevated bar failure rates, but even so the JD-advantage category is still elevated. The NALP says 40 percent of grads in these jobs are seeking other work, which tells me these positions aren’t worth much. In fact, much of their growth (not shown) is visible in business-and-industry positions, further suggesting the definition of JD-advantage is overbroad. They also strongly correlate negatively with bar-passage-required jobs and positively with grads not working.

Here’s the contribution to the percent change in law grads by employment status since 2007 and going back to 2001. We can see that despite falling total grads, a greater proportion of them are either not working or in JD-advantage positions (which are probably not legal jobs themselves).

Meanwhile, with bar-passage-required jobs contributing -15.7 percent to the -14.6 percent change in law-grad outcomes, here’s how private-practice positions have fared (-9.2 percent to all 2007 grads).

The class of 2016 is the first one to be wholly below the 2007 line, meaning that even tiny firms aren’t hiring grads like they did in the peak year. Supply of law grads does not create demand for legal services, strongly indicating that grads in past years who found these jobs only worked in them transiently until they left the legal labor market.

The NALP’s selected findings (pdf) discuss “tightness” in the job market now or at least compared to the pre-recession market. The large fall in bar-passage-required jobs and private-practice jobs argues otherwise. A tighter market would see more grads working in bigger firms and smaller firms raising wages, something the NALP’s own data don’t depict.

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Prior reporting on this topic:

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Will Law-School Employment Outcomes Be Politicized Under Trump?

Today’s headline spoofs a February 2, 2017, Atlantic article by Gene Sperling about what might happen when the U.S. government’s statistical agencies produce data that His Emolumence doesn’t like. It may still be a legitimate fear, but before anyone could neuter GDP aggregates, another statistical agency has unexpectedly taken the lead in the race to deprecate data: the American Bar Association’s Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar. As you’ve likely read elsewhere—I strongly recommend Jerry Organ’s post on TaxProf Blog—the council has chosen to greatly reduce the data it requires law schools to report and present in their respective employment-outcomes tables and spreadsheets.

I won’t recapitulate Organ’s arguments, but I will try to highlight how the changes would affect specific topics I’ve reported on and opinions I’ve developed.

One, in his memo to the council (pdf), University of Virginia School of Law professor Paul Mahoney discusses my data mishap in my post, Class of 2016 Employment Report (Corrected), as evidence of “confusion” caused by the employment data. Unsurprisingly, neither Mahoney nor anyone at the council asked me for a response, so I must start there.

The issue was the ABA’s earlier decision to separately account for school-funded positions in the above-the-line employment “statuses” (“Employed-bar-passage required,” “employed-professional position,” etc.), which collectively add up to the total number of graduates. I had forgotten the ABA made this change, so I subtracted the school-funded positions from the number of bar-passage-required jobs. I don’t relish drawing attention to my mistakes, especially when my rebuttal makes me look sloppier than the accusation: I wasn’t “confused”; I plumb forgot the ABA changed the employment table. I work with these data once a year, so I slipped into the old habit. (In fact, just last week I added a note to myself to avoid that mistake again next year.) That’s an illogical reason to revert to the previous practice. Subtracting out funded jobs is a tedious process, and I don’t want to start doing that again. For these reasons, eliminating the employment status category for school-funded positions is a bad idea.

On to other aspects of the changes.

Two, eliminating the total number of graduates from the reports makes them more difficult to use. I regularly derive the percentages of graduate employment outcomes by various categories, and now calculating the total number of graduates at a given school or at all of the schools will be a chore. Another benefit of including the number of graduates in the reports is that it gives data users an opportunity to double-check the ABA’s and law schools’ numbers—an especially important process because I do not believe the ABA does so itself. If the number of graduates in the employment status section do not add up to the total, then I know there’s a problem. It’s something I’ve tracked behind the scenes, but it’s still useful. Now, everyone will need to do more math to arrive at what should be a foundational number.

Three, the new “Employed-Other” category is absurd. A law graduate working in a professional, non-law job like at a hedge fund is not the same as flipping burgers. If anything, the ABA should put more effort into fairly defining “Employed-JD advantage” and less into consolidating categories that make law schools look bad.

Four, the new “Unemployed or status unknown” category is also absurd. Again, it’s consolidating categories that may make law schools look bad rather than carefully specifying which ones make them look good. Moreover, I detest disjunctive definitions, e.g., “Social Security/Medicare/Medicaid,” as though they’re a unified program. Disjunctive definitions encourage composition fallacies and false dilemmas, something lawyers should avoid.

Five, I have used the broad “employment type” categories (e.g., “solo,” “2-10 lawyers,” etc.) to draw conclusions about how graduates’ jobs change from year to year. For example, in the post, “Change in Graduate Outcomes Driven by Small Jobs,” which analyzes the class of 2015, discussed how most of the decline in graduates that year was felt in 2-10-lawyer jobs. I also noted how jobs were distributed among law schools in, “Law Grad Jobs Unequal Like Income in Corrupt Countries.” The new changes hamper these detailed analyses—and in a way that masks underperforming law schools. Thus, the new 10-100-lawyer-practice category is overbroad.

Six, I recognize that some school-funded positions are more durable than others as Mahoney argues and even that applicants might prefer to attend schools that reemploy their own grads as an insurance policy against unemployment. Part of the problem is that “long-term” means at least one year, which includes positions lasting only one year, but until that term is replaced by a concept that cannot be manipulated by law schools, there’s every reason to see long-term school-funded jobs as dubious attempts at padding employment outcomes. Prospective applicants actually want to know their opportunities for indefinite employment, not one- or two-year gigs, before applying. (And yes, for this reason, I somewhat discount the value of clerkships too.) Moreover, separating law-school-funded positions based on income ($40,000) is simply arbitrary. Fixed dollar amounts eventually need to be updated according to inflation, they do not necessarily reflect the cost of living for a particular location, and they do not speak to the value of legal education. The median bachelor’s-degree holder in the 25-34 age bracket earned $46,099 in 2015.

Of Organ’s other criticisms, longitudinal data and consistency with NALP data stand out. I won’t repeat them.

It’s amazing that the council is so easily swayed by the proposal of one law-school professor without much deliberation. It’s an entire level worse than if the council had secretly produced the changes on its own because then at least there may have been some give and take in the process. Now it just looks as though the council is uninterested in its responsibilities and merely beholden to individual professors’ whims. I thought the ABA wanted to improve its image as a more transparent, responsive organization, but by rubber-stamping a  professor’s (and only a professor’s) wish list, it further tarnishes its credibility.

As for my opinions on the employment questionnaire—which the council would scrutinize as I’m not a law prof—although there may be reasons to simplify the employment survey, I would very much prefer to let it rest for several years. The fact that it’s adjusted so frequently indicates lack of seriousness about its purpose.

I recommend joining Organ’s petition in his post.

LSAC Report Calls Into Question ‘Law-School Tipping Point’

One discovery I’m fond of is identifying the “law-school tipping point,” the moment when people with LSAT scores in hand decided to forgo law school entirely. I hypothesized that one could detect the tipping point by comparing over time the ratio of LSAT takers to subsequent applicants. Sure enough, the ratio spiked in the 2010 application cycle, which is the last applicant peak.

Here’s an updated version of the chart I created for that post:

(Source: LSAC (here for total LSATs and here (pdf) for first-time takers)

The arrow focuses on the pronounced gap between first-time LSAT takers in the 2009 calendar year and applicants for fall 2010. I took this as evidence of what I suspected had happened: Many people with LSAT scores in hand chose not to apply to law school the following year, presumably because they realized it was a really bad idea. In the three prior years, the ratio between first-time test takers and subsequent applicants was 1.08 on average. In 2010, it jumped to 1.19, accounting for 8,800 test takers who were not found in the 2010 application cycle. The ratio has since fallen to about 1.15 going forward.

The LSAC, however, recently published a report titled, “Analysis of LSAT Taker Application Behavior: Testing Years 2009-2010 Through 2015-2016” (pdf). It is an update of a similar report published in 2013, which I don’t recall seeing and cannot find, and it contains a table showing when test takers applied to law school.

Curiously, there’s scant evidence of a drop in test takers applying to law school, going by the first three columns of the table. People who took the LSAT between June 2009 and February 2010 pretty much all applied, save for 1 percent (~1,400 test takers). It doesn’t look like they delayed their applications either, which would cause them to appear in the rightward columns. (I don’t think the fact that I’m looking at calendar-year LSATs as opposed to June-February LSATs changes the results significantly.)

I have a hard time explaining the diverging results. It would certainly help to see previous years’ data, but my best hunch is that test-takers’ application behavior stayed the same while the frequency of their test-taking rose. In other words, perhaps many of these first-time takers simply retook the LSAT. As evidence, the LSAC report provides another figure (not shown) indicating that non-applicants tend to do very poorly on the LSAT, though they overlap with the low-end of applicants. These non-applicants may have doubled-down and chosen to retake the test again in 2010-11, and applied with whatever score they got then. Moreover, the ratio for second-time test takers to subsequent applicants (not shown) remained elevated after 2009-10 at about 0.42. Rather than walking away from the process potential applicants simply tried harder to beat the pack.

It’s a discouraging thought, but either hypothesis is valid at least to some degree until better information comes along. In the meantime, one thing the LSAC report teaches is that by and large people who do poorly on the LSAT are not as unsophisticated as they’re often portrayed. They tend to self-select by dropping out of the system. That doesn’t matter much to me since I care more about applicants, admits, and matriculants than LSAT takers, but whenever folks focus their attention on the smart people not applying to law school, just remember that many people who aren’t so good at standardized tests have been making the right choice all along.

CLASS OF 2016 EMPLOYMENT REPORT (CORRECTED)

[I made a few unfortunately significant errors when I compiled the data and created the table for full-time, long-term, bar-passage-required outcomes by law school in my first post on this topic. I overlooked the fact that the ABA now separates school-funded jobs in its employment status breakdown, meaning I subtracted school-funded jobs needlessly. I also mis-sorted the employment data for the class of 2015. Rather than correct that post, I am reposting the data, along with the information from this morning’s “second cut” to keep it all in one place. I will keep the previous posts up but will replace their text with links redirecting readers to this site to preserve links to that information and comments.

I hate making these kinds of preventable mistakes, so I apologize to readers. However, I greatly appreciate those of you who reached out to me to notify me of the errors.]

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On Thursday, the ABA updated its Employment Summary Report Web site, which provides employment data for each law school class going back to 2010. Many if not all law schools have uploaded their individual reports, and some intrepid researchers have already dug into them, but I prefer to wait until the easy-to-use spreadsheet comes out. The ABA may revise these data over the next few months, but this first cut gives a good sense of the class of 2016’s employment outcomes. Also, completionists will note that while Indiana Tech graduated a small number of students last year, it did not report their employment outcomes. I exclude it.

36,618 people graduated from 200 ABA-accredited law schools outside of Puerto Rico roughly between September 1, 2015, and August 31, 2016. The employment information should be good as of about March 15, 2017.

Here’s the pie chart of the employment status distribution.

I’ll analyze these numbers in more depth in my second cut, but overall the percentages look slightly better than last year. However, even though there are fewer graduates (down 15 percent from two years ago) the proportion obtaining work hasn’t risen dramatically.

More tables appear below the fold to conserve blog space.

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(more…)

Which Law Schools Are Like Whittier?

Whittier Law School announced it will no longer enroll 1L classes but will graduate the students it has. It is the first fully accredited law school that is straight up closing, i.e. it isn’t merging with another school or finding some other way out of its problems. It’s going for good.

Whittier is not the school I would’ve predicted to be the first to close. Certainly it was in a high-risk category, but I thought others were in direr straits, and Whittier isn’t even freestanding. Charlotte lost its federal loan funding. The ABA censured Valparaiso (pdf), put Arizona Summit on probation (pdf), and told Ave Maria it was out of compliance with its standards (pdf). La Verne lost its provisional accreditation once, and the fates of (un)merged Camden and Penn-State Dickinson appear sealed. Indiana Tech immolated on the launch pad. These days the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar’s Web site looks more like an academic police blotter than an accrediting body’s homepage.

The question all this raises is: What law schools might be in situations similar to Whittier’s?

We can answer by comparing Whittier to other law schools on various dimensions, particularly debt, employment outcomes, and estimated revenue from full-time students paying full tuition. (Others have already done most of the work on bar-passage rates.)

This past year, U.S. News ranked Whittier as number two for average disbursed graduate debt, $179,056, but its figure was 20 percent higher than last year. It’s a volatile measure, but this year some of its notable nearest neighbors were Thomas Jefferson, San Francisco, American, Golden Gate, John Marshall (Chicago), and Florida Coastal. Most of these law schools featured prominently on debt rankings in previous years.

A couple years ago, I applied the Department of Education’s “gainful employment” rule to all law schools—not just for-profits—and found that Whittier’s 2014 graduates would need to earn more than $80,000 to avoid a failing grade. Four years of failing would mean losing access to federal funding, and nearly a quarter of Whittier’s graduates were totally unemployed after graduating. That figure hasn’t improved since (~23 percent for class of 2015 grads). We’ll soon learn how bad the class of 2016 is doing, but Whittier’s full-time, long-term, bar-passage-required employment rate has been so abysmal that it ranks near the three law schools in Puerto Rico. (Yes, bar-passage rates feed into this outcome.)

The one metric where Whittier wasn’t doing as badly as many other (private) law schools was its cumulative losses in tuition revenue from full-time students. In 2015-16, it took in nearly $6 million, but in 2011-12 it received $13.5 million. The 56 percent drop puts it at number 64 among private law schools (though the top schools, Vermont, Brooklyn, WMU Cooley, and California Western, reported more students receiving grants than they had full-time students, which would probably bump Whittier up a few notches). 56 percent is rough, but a bunch of private law schools lost even larger shares of money—and some took in only a few hundred thousand dollars in full-time tuition revenue last year.

Here’s what the situation looks like for all private law schools, sorted by the percent decline. Note that for once, I am including the two private law schools in Puerto Rico because I feel their performance is indicative of the worst. These figures are adjusted for inflation.

REVENUE FROM FULL-TIME STUDENTS PAYING FULL-TUITION
# SCHOOL 2011 2015 CUMULATIVE LOSS PERCENT CHANGE
1. Vermont 10,860,119 -5,422,079 -16,282,198 -149.9%
2. Brooklyn 10,782,779 -3,509,376 -14,292,155 -132.5%
3. WMU Cooley 1,557,772 -478,900 -2,036,672 -130.7%
4. California Western 25,045,967 -897,940 -25,943,907 -103.6%
5. St. Thomas (MN) 5,743,284 37,941 -5,705,343 -99.3%
6. Appalachian 9,093,131 125,300 -8,967,831 -98.6%
7. Washington and Lee 6,903,362 185,988 -6,717,374 -97.3%
8. Tulsa 4,599,211 142,116 -4,457,095 -96.9%
9. DePaul 14,469,813 681,750 -13,788,063 -95.3%
10. Albany 19,114,661 1,952,910 -17,161,751 -89.8%
11. Widener (Commonwealth) 9,036,506 965,862 -8,070,644 -89.3%
12. New York Law School 41,803,974 4,530,080 -37,273,894 -89.2%
13. Northeastern 4,283,568 511,720 -3,771,848 -88.1%
14. Syracuse 8,186,463 1,132,272 -7,054,191 -86.2%
15. Florida Coastal 33,851,726 4,908,200 -28,943,526 -85.5%
16. Duquesne 12,035,146 1,749,704 -10,285,442 -85.5%
17. Ohio Northern 8,637,468 1,301,500 -7,335,968 -84.9%
18. Pacific, McGeorge 11,571,986 1,786,138 -9,785,848 -84.6%
19. Campbell 15,454,205 2,407,975 -13,046,230 -84.4%
20. Regent 2,904,848 453,570 -2,451,278 -84.4%
21. Mercer 15,437,642 2,719,980 -12,717,662 -82.4%
22. Lewis and Clark 8,873,433 1,611,792 -7,261,641 -81.8%
23. Case Western Reserve 8,801,033 1,705,620 -7,095,413 -80.6%
24. St. Louis 18,241,963 3,605,940 -14,636,023 -80.2%
25. Southern California 15,531,071 3,075,166 -12,455,905 -80.2%
26. Charleston 10,513,451 2,206,380 -8,307,071 -79.0%
27. Faulkner 7,911,732 1,822,600 -6,089,132 -77.0%
28. Seton Hall 13,687,741 3,163,116 -10,524,625 -76.9%
29. Southern Methodist 6,211,571 1,448,898 -4,762,673 -76.7%
30. Charlotte 35,712,406 8,517,688 -27,194,718 -76.1%
31. Catholic 10,588,407 2,528,010 -8,060,397 -76.1%
32. Dayton 8,333,640 1,997,240 -6,336,400 -76.0%
33. Wake Forest 7,890,988 1,923,210 -5,967,778 -75.6%
34. Ave Maria 9,074,461 2,293,830 -6,780,631 -74.7%
35. Widener (Delaware) 15,458,193 3,989,430 -11,468,763 -74.2%
36. Western State 5,821,292 1,517,250 -4,304,042 -73.9%
37. Loyola (LA) 15,784,287 4,123,950 -11,660,337 -73.9%
38. Touro 11,489,969 3,078,650 -8,411,319 -73.2%
39. Quinnipiac 4,800,111 1,297,323 -3,502,788 -73.0%
40. Boston University 9,809,602 2,762,480 -7,047,122 -71.8%
41. Gonzaga 4,965,149 1,423,890 -3,541,259 -71.3%
42. Golden Gate 14,318,443 4,263,350 -10,055,093 -70.2%
43. Chicago-Kent, IIT 12,104,788 3,979,870 -8,124,918 -67.1%
44. Pace 11,888,268 3,993,088 -7,895,180 -66.4%
45. Atlanta’s John Marshall 16,084,711 5,613,700 -10,471,011 -65.1%
46. Mississippi College 12,823,594 4,506,420 -8,317,174 -64.9%
47. Washington University 11,705,942 4,181,706 -7,524,236 -64.3%
48. Stetson 22,598,743 8,212,224 -14,386,519 -63.7%
49. Valparaiso 15,710,039 5,732,824 -9,977,215 -63.5%
50. Northwestern 28,591,723 10,570,038 -18,021,685 -63.0%
51. Fordham 38,473,640 14,340,740 -24,132,900 -62.7%
52. Oklahoma City 10,178,065 3,810,630 -6,367,435 -62.6%
53. Elon 3,280,392 1,233,358 -2,047,034 -62.4%
54. Capital 7,447,505 2,820,480 -4,627,025 -62.1%
55. Cardozo, Yeshiva 21,942,175 8,838,095 -13,104,080 -59.7%
56. John Marshall (Chicago) 25,576,716 10,437,840 -15,138,876 -59.2%
57. Villanova 13,909,852 5,785,440 -8,124,412 -58.4%
58. Thomas Jefferson 17,301,310 7,207,200 -10,094,110 -58.3%
59. Samford 11,286,294 4,822,480 -6,463,814 -57.3%
60. Santa Clara 16,091,642 6,913,980 -9,177,662 -57.0%
61. San Diego 19,178,183 8,350,101 -10,828,082 -56.5%
62. Roger Williams 12,099,840 5,362,380 -6,737,460 -55.7%
63. St. John’s 18,866,076 8,366,530 -10,499,546 -55.7%
64. Whittier 13,502,174 5,989,950 -7,512,224 -55.6%
65. Seattle 15,747,526 7,248,700 -8,498,826 -54.0%
66. Creighton 7,850,075 3,625,800 -4,224,275 -53.8%
67. Hofstra 23,812,510 11,012,750 -12,799,760 -53.8%
68. Drexel 2,205,873 1,056,750 -1,149,123 -52.1%
69. Drake 6,852,106 3,342,476 -3,509,630 -51.2%
70. Vanderbilt 5,452,630 2,670,720 -2,781,910 -51.0%
71. Loyola (CA) 29,845,203 14,914,900 -14,930,303 -50.0%
72. Detroit Mercy 15,782,962 7,903,740 -7,879,222 -49.9%
73. Michigan State 12,439,389 6,453,892 -5,985,497 -48.1%
74. Tulane 13,779,350 7,311,590 -6,467,760 -46.9%
75. Barry 6,669,908 3,727,776 -2,942,132 -44.1%
76. Chicago 12,401,406 7,083,930 -5,317,476 -42.9%
77. Arizona Summit [Phoenix] 12,828,297 7,562,152 -5,266,145 -41.1%
78. St. Thomas (FL) 16,799,445 9,990,390 -6,809,055 -40.5%
79. South Texas 17,958,443 10,704,870 -7,253,573 -40.4%
80. Pontifical Catholic 8,442,917 5,132,426 -3,310,491 -39.2%
81. Nova Southeastern 24,168,295 14,852,135 -9,316,160 -38.5%
82. Marquette 11,533,718 7,312,710 -4,221,008 -36.6%
83. Miami 34,008,712 21,832,718 -12,175,994 -35.8%
84. San Francisco 15,483,541 10,028,040 -5,455,501 -35.2%
85. Western New England 3,630,743 2,375,332 -1,255,411 -34.6%
86. Chapman 13,208,102 8,859,600 -4,348,502 -32.9%
87. New England 12,668,264 8,665,140 -4,003,124 -31.6%
88. Suffolk 27,272,730 18,739,094 -8,533,636 -31.3%
89. Cornell 18,586,044 12,775,953 -5,810,091 -31.3%
90. Boston College 16,102,424 11,277,420 -4,825,004 -30.0%
91. Inter American 6,898,330 5,040,051 -1,858,279 -26.9%
92. Loyola (IL) 4,583,328 3,351,312 -1,232,016 -26.9%
93. Southwestern 20,968,555 15,449,600 -5,518,955 -26.3%
94. American 31,922,411 23,868,936 -8,053,475 -25.2%
95. Notre Dame 7,908,972 5,918,036 -1,990,936 -25.2%
96. Denver 17,465,736 14,026,950 -3,438,786 -19.7%
97. Emory 8,896,804 7,211,400 -1,685,404 -18.9%
98. Richmond 7,438,055 6,232,200 -1,205,855 -16.2%
99. Georgetown 52,209,277 43,872,470 -8,336,807 -16.0%
100. Baylor 5,148,380 4,777,042 -371,338 -7.2%
101. St. Mary’s 14,146,074 13,128,560 -1,017,514 -7.2%
102. Columbia 38,452,666 35,989,800 -2,462,866 -6.4%
103. Yale 15,515,266 14,918,850 -596,416 -3.8%
104. New York University 46,942,488 46,870,700 -71,788 -0.2%
105. Pennsylvania 22,739,776 23,802,872 1,063,096 4.7%
106. Willamette 3,947,758 4,251,625 303,867 7.7%
107. George Washington 32,385,362 35,444,670 3,059,308 9.4%
108. Pepperdine 11,117,822 12,539,100 1,421,278 12.8%
109. Harvard 41,997,217 51,660,654 9,663,437 23.0%
110. Duke 3,507,038 5,136,813 1,629,775 46.5%
111. Howard 5,501,024 8,221,176 2,720,152 49.4%
112. Stanford 11,569,636 17,613,762 6,044,126 52.2%
113. Liberty 96,858 189,372 92,514 95.5%
114. La Verne 171,882 3,369,344 3,197,462 1860.3%
115. Belmont 4,805,640 N/A N/A
116. Concordia 203,301 N/A N/A
118. Indiana Tech 94,080 N/A N/A
119. Lincoln Memorial 387,480 N/A N/A
TOTAL 1,672,895,574 849,546,398 -828,839,677 -49.2%
10TH PERCENTILE 4,583,328 203,301 -14,636,023 -89.3%
25TH PERCENTILE 7,890,988 1,822,600 -10,094,110 -76.9%
MEDIAN 12,253,097 4,518,250 -6,759,046 -58.4%
75TH PERCENTILE 17,465,736 8,517,688 -3,438,786 -32.9%
90TH PERCENTILE 29,845,203 14,918,850 -371,338 -3.8%
MEAN 14,674,523 7,199,546 -7,270,523 -36.3%

(Source: ABA, author’s calculations)

Obviously full-time, full-tuition revenue doesn’t tell all of the story—and not just for part-time-focused operations like WMU Cooley—but it definitely illustrates the kind of circumstances many private law schools find themselves in. The same must be true for public law schools. It’s in this context that we can ponder the solvency of other at-risk law schools. Whittier is the first big closure, but it won’t be the last. Universities whose law schools are losing lots of money and have poor employment and bar-passage outcomes are watching Whittier and its neighbors.

Only 13 Law Schools Didn’t Report 2016 Graduate Debt to U.S. News

Each year U.S. News & World Report lists law schools by the average indebtedness of their graduates. Importantly, the figures exclude accrued interest, which can be quite considerable. However, these numbers are probably the best estimate of the cost of attendance at a particular law school presented in a comparable form. The ABA does not publicize graduate debt in the 509 information reports, making U.S. News an unfortunately necessary source.

Here’s the debt table. A recurring problem in U.S. News’ debt data is law schools that misreport their graduating students’ annual debt as opposed to their cumulative debt, which is what the magazine asks for. Thus, I include last year’s numbers for illustration and encourage ridicule of law schools that cannot follow basic directions, but I welcome corrections.

# SCHOOL 2015 DEBT 2016 DEBT PCT. CHANGE
1. Thomas Jefferson 172,726 182,411 5.6%
2. Whittier 148,316 179,056 20.7%
3. San Francisco 162,434 167,671 3.2%
4. New York University 166,022 167,646 1.0%
5. Georgetown 160,606 166,027 3.4%
6. American 160,274 164,194 2.4%
7. Golden Gate 143,740 161,809 12.6%
8. Columbia 168,627 159,769 -5.3%
9. John Marshall (Chicago) 162,264 158,888 -2.1%
10. Florida Coastal 160,942 158,878 -1.3%
11. Cornell 155,025 158,128 2.0%
12. New York Law School 161,910 157,568 -2.7%
13. Pennsylvania 144,153 156,725 8.7%
14. Virginia 146,907 155,177 5.6%
15. Northwestern 155,796 154,923 -0.6%
16. Pepperdine 148,959 154,475 3.7%
17. Elon 128,407 153,347 19.4%
18. Harvard 149,754 153,172 2.3%
19. Ave Maria 134,071 152,476 13.7%
20. Detroit Mercy 137,047 152,000 10.9%
21. Barry 138,410 151,479 9.4%
22. Denver 132,158 150,055 13.5%
23. Santa Clara 144,130 149,940 4.0%
24. Miami 155,796 149,580 -4.0%
25. Willamette 133,318 148,429 11.3%
26. Nova Southeastern 123,798 147,879 19.5%
27. California Western 162,260 147,302 -9.2%
28. Loyola (CA) 148,035 146,494 -1.0%
29. Michigan 142,572 146,309 2.6%
30. California-Berkeley 144,981 145,260 0.2%
31. George Washington 136,662 145,240 6.3%
32. Baylor 135,817 144,732 6.6%
33. Pacific, McGeorge 149,470 144,431 -3.4%
34. Chapman 103,956 144,409 38.9%
35. Marquette 138,549 142,601 2.9%
36. Hofstra 125,300 142,261 13.5%
37. Southern California 134,673 140,745 4.5%
38. Seattle 136,889 139,745 2.1%
39. Lewis and Clark 140,025 139,624 -0.3%
40. Tulane 153,606 139,508 -9.2%
41. Duke 131,073 137,829 5.2%
42. Stanford 132,970 137,625 3.5%
43. Charleston 146,230 137,345 -6.1%
44. California-Hastings 135,886 137,157 0.9%
45. Valparaiso 131,024 136,765 4.4%
46. Mercer 138,575 135,300 -2.4%
47. Suffolk 138,724 135,272 -2.5%
48. Widener (Delaware) 136,992 135,151 -1.3%
49. Chicago 129,636 134,148 3.5%
50. Catholic 139,803 133,917 -4.2%
51. Campbell 115,128 131,894 14.6%
52. Creighton 117,980 130,145 10.3%
53. Widener (Commonwealth) 148,496 129,016 -13.1%
54. Stetson 130,079 128,703 -1.1%
55. San Diego 135,433 127,693 -5.7%
56. Samford 124,106 127,611 2.8%
57. Vanderbilt 114,447 127,434 11.3%
58. DePaul 131,148 126,446 -3.6%
59. Roger Williams 123,332 126,334 2.4%
60. Southern Methodist 124,723 126,172 1.2%
61. Seton Hall 133,000 125,300 -5.8%
62. Pace 124,823 124,317 -0.4%
63. Regent 93,142 124,221 33.4%
64. Notre Dame 122,822 123,924 0.9%
65. Yale 122,796 121,815 -0.8%
66. Western New England 121,367
67. Emory 121,278 120,804 -0.4%
68. Washington 111,003 120,554 8.6%
69. Western State 122,315 119,382 -2.4%
70. Mississippi College 129,000 119,000 -7.8%
71. Cardozo, Yeshiva 119,294 118,764 -0.4%
72. St. Mary’s 122,560 118,583 -3.2%
73. California-Los Angeles 118,874 118,291 -0.5%
74. George Mason 121,910 118,056 -3.2%
75. Penn State (Penn State Law) 129,772 117,692 -9.3%
76. Brooklyn 108,942 117,581 7.9%
77. St. John’s 115,666 117,572 1.6%
78. St. Louis 113,070 117,335 3.8%
79. Syracuse 139,753 117,127 -16.2%
80. Fordham 149,058 116,326 -22.0%
81. Texas A&M [Wesleyan] 104,200 115,405 10.8%
82. Maryland 114,493 113,927 -0.5%
83. Drake 107,679 112,893 4.8%
84. Northeastern 127,406 111,410 -12.6%
85. Penn State (Dickinson Law) 116,717 109,828 -5.9%
86. Gonzaga 125,347 109,692 -12.5%
87. Boston College 112,439 108,873 -3.2%
88. Dayton 115,740 108,724 -6.1%
89. Duquesne 104,623 108,414 3.6%
90. Baltimore 112,008 108,328 -3.3%
91. Chicago-Kent, IIT 115,040 107,688 -6.4%
92. Albany 125,157 107,185 -14.4%
93. Minnesota 92,179 106,436 15.5%
94. Washington and Lee 110,067 105,426 -4.2%
95. District of Columbia 108,095 105,330 -2.6%
96. Wake Forest 97,550 105,090 7.7%
97. Indiana (Indianapolis) 106,114 105,065 -1.0%
98. Boston University 102,329 104,755 2.4%
99. Richmond 110,665 104,624 -5.5%
100. Ohio Northern 102,414 104,284 1.8%
101. Pittsburgh 104,484 103,990 -0.5%
102. California-Davis 113,765 103,811 -8.7%
103. Texas 102,101 103,417 1.3%
104. Case Western Reserve 105,854 102,370 -3.3%
105. Oklahoma City 121,607 102,024 -16.1%
106. Quinnipiac 97,335 101,371 4.1%
107. St. Thomas (MN) 101,950 100,805 -1.1%
108. Mitchell|Hamline 108,019 100,603
109. Colorado 107,080 100,499 -6.1%
110. California-Irvine 125,473 100,408 -20.0%
111. Indiana (Bloomington) 91,020 99,895 9.8%
112. Illinois 118,731 99,782 -16.0%
113. Villanova 110,792 99,736 -10.0%
114. Louisville 86,880 99,581 14.6%
115. Massachusetts — Dartmouth 102,603 98,730 -3.8%
116. Arizona State 106,426 97,780 -8.1%
117. Nevada 81,579 97,361 19.3%
118. Houston 87,602 97,246 11.0%
119. Drexel 100,362 96,402 -3.9%
120. New Hampshire 108,896 95,650 -12.2%
121. North Carolina 102,828 95,365 -7.3%
122. Florida International 95,331 93,838 -1.6%
123. Washington University 109,232 93,768 -14.2%
124. Missouri (Kansas City) 96,639 93,678 -3.1%
125. Utah 79,124 91,982 16.3%
126. Michigan State 93,245 91,014 -2.4%
127. SUNY Buffalo 86,970 90,546 4.1%
128. Wyoming 77,421 90,231 16.5%
129. William and Mary 110,140 90,028 -18.3%
130. Lincoln Memorial 95,495 89,779 -6.0%
131. Southern University 86,708 89,552 3.3%
132. Maine 99,617 89,513 -10.1%
133. South Carolina 85,006 89,388 5.2%
134. Kansas 80,884 88,809 9.8%
135. Florida State 82,102 88,732 8.1%
136. Loyola (IL) 133,052 88,588 -33.4%
137. Ohio State 96,253 88,301 -8.3%
138. Southern Illinois 90,727 87,634 -3.4%
139. Temple 86,999 86,937 -0.1%
140. Northern Illinois 77,975 86,899 11.4%
141. Idaho 81,993 86,022 4.9%
142. Toledo 94,295 85,649 -9.2%
143. Arizona 100,902 84,601 -16.2%
144. Louisiana State 90,609 83,919 -7.4%
145. Oklahoma 82,818 83,433 0.7%
146. Akron 78,575 82,854 5.4%
147. West Virginia 85,063 82,683 -2.8%
148. Hawaii 54,988 82,510 50.1%
149. Florida 84,580 82,480 -2.5%
150. Georgia 86,515 82,199 -5.0%
151. Wayne State 82,397 81,738 -0.8%
152. Washburn 86,621 81,528 -5.9%
153. Tennessee 66,939 80,445 20.2%
154. Missouri (Columbia) 81,149 80,138 -1.2%
155. Texas Tech 74,673 80,087 7.3%
156. City University 77,751 78,523 1.0%
157. Wisconsin 84,650 77,555 -8.4%
158. Memphis 77,752 76,997 -1.0%
159. Tulsa 82,954 76,988 -7.2%
160. Alabama 74,921 75,577 0.9%
161. Cincinnati 82,988 75,512 -9.0%
162. Montana 79,304 75,470 -4.8%
163. New Mexico 69,366 75,277 8.5%
164. Northern Kentucky 84,714 74,190 -12.4%
165. Iowa 86,373 74,128 -14.2%
166. Liberty 68,667 73,857 7.6%
167. Connecticut 69,195 72,042 4.1%
168. Arkansas (Fayetteville) 64,901 67,758 4.4%
169. Mississippi 71,330 67,539 -5.3%
170. North Dakota 69,058 66,917 -3.1%
171. Arkansas (Little Rock) 68,960 65,931 -4.4%
172. Georgia State 66,637 64,384 -3.4%
173. Nebraska 58,744 62,888 7.1%
174. North Carolina Central 27,972 60,479 116.2%
175. Kentucky 77,793 59,163 -23.9%
176. Brigham Young 62,423 58,133 -6.9%
177. South Dakota 57,170 56,609 -1.0%
178. Rutgers 89,507 56,173
179. Vermont 156,710 52,682 -66.4%
180. Howard 141,044 50,920 -63.9%
181. Belmont 56,225 40,677 -27.7%
182. Loyola (LA) 124,143 39,138 -68.5%
183. South Texas 121,767 38,717 -68.2%
184. Capital 116,283 35,079 -69.8%
185. Cleveland State 93,865 29,051 -69.1%
186. Florida A&M 20,500
187. Faulkner 18,434
188. Oregon 106,540 17,834 -83.3%
10TH PERCENTILE 77,421 65,931 -16.0
25TH PERCENTILE 86,999 85,649 -6.1%
MEDIAN 112,439 105,330 -1.0%
75TH PERCENTILE 133,318 135,151 4.5%
90TH PERCENTILE 148,496 152,000 11.4%
MEAN 111,874 107,608 -2.1%

Note: Mitchell|Hamline’s 2015 entry is the bare mean average of William Mitchell’s and Hamline’s 2015 figures.

And per this post’s title, here’s the List of Shame: Law schools that chose not to submit their graduates’ debt information to U.S. News, along with their last-reported figures and the year in which they reported them. Thanks to the gainful employment rule, I was able to track down median graduate debt at three for-profits. As I am merciful, I exclude the three Puerto Rico law schools from this count.

  • Arizona Summit [Phoenix] – $178,263 [2015, median, for-profit]
  • Atlanta’s John Marshall – $161,910 [2015, median, for-profit]
  • Charlotte – $145,834 [2015, median, for-profit]
  • Touro – $154,855 (2014)
  • Southwestern – $147,976 (2012)
  • Thomas (FL) – $140,808 (2014)
  • New England – $132,246 (2013)
  • WMU Cooley – $122,395 (2012)
  • Appalachian – $114,740 (2012)
  • La Verne – $112,628 (2012)
  • Texas Southern – $99,992 (2012)
  • Concordia – NEVER
  • Indiana Tech – NEVER

These 13 law schools account for 2,282 graduates out of 36,664, or 6 percent of the total.

Normally, I would estimate the change in the weighted-average amount of debt law graduates at public and private law school take on, but because U.S. News reported absurdly high percentages of graduates with debt at each law school, I decline to make those estimates now. However, the unweighted-average private-law-school graduate debt, which is what is commonly reported, fell by 3 percent; it also fell by 4 percent at public law schools. Much of this is due to clear misreporting by law schools, some of which after all these years still report their graduates’ debt in their final year of law school.

Speaking of which, here are some curious results:

  • Fluctuations: Hawaii (+50.1%), Chapman (+38.9%), Regent (+33.4%), Whittier (+20.7%), Tennessee (+20.2%), California-Irvine (-20.0%), Fordham (-22.0%), Kentucky (-23.9%), Belmont (-27.7%), and Loyola (IL) (-33.4%).
  • Big raspberries: Howard (-63.9), Vermont (-66.4), South Texas (-68.2), Loyola (LA) (-68.5), Cleveland State (-69.1), Capital (-69.8), and Oregon (-83.3).

In all, it’s good the non-reporting count fell. Kudos to the law schools that reported this year that did not for 2015, even if I don’t believe Faulkner’s or Florida A&M’s grads finished with so little debt.

Click to read the 2015 edition, the 2014 edition, or the 2013 edition of this post.