…Is the topic of my latest article on The American Lawyer.
The LSAC was oddly slow putting up December LSAT data, but that’s okay because I have little to say about it. The number of LSAT takers has grown for five consecutive testing periods, but things slowed down this time.
29,115 people took the LSAT in December, up a mere 1.9 percent over last year. The four-period moving sum grew a mere half a percent to 105,940.
I have no insight into whether this slowdown means anything or is just a blip. I’ll speculate after the February or June administrations.
Once upon a time, more than half of law students at the typical law school paid full tuition.
But that fairy tale is now over. Behold:
I’m astonished. Now, only about a third of law students at the average law school pay full tuition. These schools must be hemorrhaging money given how much they’re fighting over applicants.
At the average private law school in 2014, there were more students who received less-than-half tuition grants than there were students given a full bill. It appears that in a couple years, even the half-to-full-tuition crowd will outnumber the full freighters—and this is last year’s data!
Speaking of hemorrhaging money, in 2014, full-time law students paying full tuition only contributed $1 billion to private law schools. This year, it’s probably less.
Finally, here’s what tuition discounted by the median grant looks like at private law schools by the mean of their full tuition quintiles. The idea here is to set full tuition as the independent variable and let the discounted tuition float.
Last year, the mean discounted tuition among law schools in the second full-tuition quintile was lower than the third’s, meaning second-quintile schools are discounting much more than schools that nominally charge less. I think it’s trivial, but it indicates pricing competition.
That’s all for now.
…But it’s certainly debatable how much students are actually paying.
Here’s the dispersion of stated law-school tuition for full-time students in constant dollars as of the end of second quarter 2015. (I’m not hugely into non-resident tuition.)
The law school at the median charged about $1,300 more than last year. Inflation has been so low that real tuition fell last year, but that’s been reversed.
There has been talk recently (I forget when specifically, and I’m too lazy to look it up right now) of law schools cutting their nominal tuition, but from the above chart it’s obvious that these are isolated cases that have not influenced any trends. In fact, I did a quick check and none of the private law schools that cut their tuition in the last two years (La Verne, Brooklyn, Elon, Ohio Northern, and Roger Williams spring from my spreadsheets) saw any increase in full-time applications. Certainly there’s something to be said about the elasticity of demand for law school, but I’ll consider that later.
Still, full-time private law schools’ tuition increases are slowing, but this year they hiccuped upward.
In each of the last three years, at least 10 percent of tuition increases among private law schools was 0 percent or less. I don’t think this year’s hiccup means anything.
Finally, here’s nominal tuition increases by tuition quintile mean.
As with last year, the weight of tuition increases is still on the costlier end of law schools. Surprisingly, Columbia remains the only law school that charges more than $60,000 per year. (Cornell was 19 bucks short. *clap* … *clap*)
In closing, I want to extend my thanks to the law schools for not omitting tuition information from their 509 reports. Some didn’t last year, which is bizarre to me.
On Tuesday, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released its employment projections for the next cycle: 2014-2024.
In 2014, the BLS estimated that there were 778,700 lawyer positions (as opposed to discrete lawyers) in the United States. This figure includes self-employed lawyers. In 2012, the Employment Projections Program found 759,800 lawyer positions, so there has been some growth. According to the Current Population Survey, in 2014, 1.132 million people worked as lawyers in the United States. The discrepancy between the CPS and the EPP has existed for some time. In their respective contexts, both figures are correct.
The BLS projects future employment trends in part to help job seekers evaluate career choices, and the projections play a significant role in the BLS’s Occupational Outlook Handbook. Here is an illustration, from various sources, of law-school graduate and lawyer growth since the 1980s.
Between 2014 and 2024, the BLS estimates a total 157,700 net lawyer jobs will be created. Of those, only 43,800 can be attributed to economic growth over the decade. The rest, 113,900, consist of net occupational replacements. Last year, I wrote about how the BLS plans to revise its replacement methodology, switching from a net replacement measurement to a gross one. When applied to lawyers, it appeared more jobs would be created annually than under the current methodology. The BLS has not yet adopted the new methodology.
Unfortunately—and despite my warnings—some law professors concluded that a higher replacement rate meant better job prospects for law school graduates. However, this position fails to account for turnover—the rate at which lawyers leave the law for different occupations or leave the labor force entirely. In fact, in a prototype analysis of the new methodology, the BLS estimated that over ten years one lawyer in four would move to a different occupation. By comparison, the rate for physicians was only 15 percent. It is unlikely that every lawyer moving to a different occupation will find work in a field that requires the skills and knowledge obtained in law school or pays accordingly.
The BLS typically divides the ten-year employment projection by ten, suggesting that only 15,770 lawyer positions will be created each year until 2024. Despite falling law-school enrollments, but with the number of applicants possibly rising, it does not appear that the economy will be able to absorb all new lawyers completing law school. Indeed, in 2014, 43,800 people graduated from ABA law schools, but it’s likely that fewer than 40,000 graduated in 2015. The number of people admitted to the bar by admission and diploma privilege—a measure of new lawyer growth—was 54,820 in 2014, but this includes many duplicates.
The number of law school graduates and new bar admits far exceed the projected lawyer job growth rate. Consequently, it appears that although interest in law school has waned, far more people are attending law school than the profession can employ.
My opinions of J.D. advantage jobs can be found here.
My comprehensive explanation of the various measures of law-school grads and lawyers can be found on this page. It also should contain any links I may have omitted in this post.
Like the lost, fictitious island of Atlantis, the LSAC’s first report of the 2016 law-school application cycle predicts an applicant rise! At 13,881 applicants as of week 48, it appears more than 55,500 people will apply to law school next year.
Importantly, the LSAC has changed its reporting from fall-term applicants only to applicants for all academic terms. I don’t like changes like these as they impair past comparisons, but it’s probably the right thing to do. It’s unclear when the 2016-17 academic year begins, so I’ll try to treat these concepts with caution until I’m sure.
As it is, in week 48 of 2014, there were 11,415 applicants for the fall term, so a substantial number of people are now being included who were not before, more than 2,000 applicants apparently. What is notable is the difference between the number of applications per applicant.
For fall 2015: 6.13
For all 2016: 5.36 (approx.)
For all 2016: 5.12
In fact, according to the current report, applicants are up slightly for 2016, but applications have fallen by 4.1 percent. Although final predictions based on the first reported week are volatile, these numbers suggest that while some people might believe now is the best time ever to go to law school, they don’t believe it for all law schools. I’ve posited that the distribution of applications matters too and will continue to do so going forward.
Here are links to my past reporting on the opening of the applicant horse race: November 2013 and November 2014, both predicting applicant declines that didn’t pan out. In both those years, the final applicant count rose above the initial projections, meaning that the number of applicants “accelerated” into the cycle. Here’s an illustration starting in January of the application year:
(Note: This is based on old LSAC data that applies to the fall term only.)
Over the last three years, a growing proportion of applicants didn’t apply until later in the cycle. If this phenomenon continues, i.e. back-loading applicants, then we can expect more than 55,500 total applicants by fall 2016.
I’m not sure why applicants are appearing later than the in past. It’s possibly due to law schools moving their application deadlines further back to capture more bodies and those applicants obliging. Alternatively, the applicant crash that started in 2010 might have affected the earlier chunk of the application cycle. In other words, the type of people who chose not apply to law school are the ones who would’ve first applied in November-January.
Between back-loading applicants, rising applicants, and falling applications, this cycle might throw us some curve balls.
The New America Foundation’s article, “Income-Based Repayment Tops Repayment Plan Choice for First Time,” is such blatant policy trolling that you might wonder if it’s still Halloween and not Thanksgiving.
The NAF discovered that income-based-repayment program-enrollment efforts have borne fruit: It’s now the most popular plan among direct loan borrowers. (I haven’t checked myself, but let’s roll with it.) But the NAF’s response is confused: On the one hand, it likes low-income people enrolling in IBR, and it wants IBR to be the default repayment plan. This position is neither unusual or, superficially, disagreeable.
But on the other hand, growing IBR hordes keep the NAF awake at night:
Policymakers have to ask themselves, if college is a good investment, why are borrowers flocking to this insurance program? And why are those trends occurring while other economic indicators, like unemployment rates, are looking pretty good?
The easy answer is that college is not a good investment and “other economic indicators” are not looking pretty good. For one, the unemployment rate isn’t such a good measure of work when so many people leave the labor force.
Here’s the percent of 25-34-year-olds with zero earnings by education.
In 2014, 13 percent of college-educated young ‘uns weren’t working; in 1997 that was 7.1 percent, equivalent to 640,000 people. It’s possible many of these folks are back in school, but that just tells us the opportunity cost of education is low—because there aren’t any good jobs. And yes, incomes are down too.
The NAF then trots out (trolls out?) the discredited IBR deadbeat after linking to the GAO finding that only a fraction of IBR enrollees have high incomes:
Maybe IBR enrollment is not a good proxy for borrowers falling on hard times — at least not since the Obama administration … [changed the program] from what was a safety net in 2009 to a heavily subsidized loan program for even well-off borrowers if they borrow for graduate school.
Except the NAF’s research on the changes to IBR didn’t show anything of the kind. Its “Safety Net or Windfall” report never documented a single IBR deadbeat. Instead it crafted nothing other than hypotheticals: Its “narrated borrower examples” even included a law grad who went to California Western, a law school with bad employment outcomes, yet managed to start a job at $65,000 per year. After ten years “Robert” miraculously switched to a job that paid him more than $100,000 per year, and after 25 years, he was make more than $200,000.
Why not just say that he inherited $40,000,000,000 from his wealthy uncle who also happened to be the pretender to both the Qing dynasty’s and Ottoman Empire’s thrones? It’d still fit the NAF’s definition of research.
In truth, only 14 of California Western’s 219 graduates in 2014 found full-time, long-term work at law firms with more than 25 lawyers. 58 were either unemployed or couldn’t be found. The Pay-As-You-Earn changes to IBR benefited these people quite a bit because they will never repay their loans anyway. Income is the independent variable, not debt, and it’s pretty unlikely that after 30 years any California Western grads will be earning $240,000 annually like “Robert”—unless you live in the NAF’s world where one can pass off fantasy as policy analysis.
Because the economy is improving, the NAF reasons, there must—must—be another reason those folks are signing onto IBR:
Borrowers may be enrolling in IBR because they know a good deal when they see one. And as word gets out, more and more students are likely to borrow larger sums to pursue graduate school because they plan to use IBR. That is especially true if they qualify for earlier loan forgiveness under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness benefit. [Emphasis original.]
If this were true, then we’d expect law-school enrollments to swell, even at schools where the credential leads nowhere. Hey, who are students to argue if the government gives Grad PLUS dollars toward their living expenses and not demand they pay it back?
Except that’s still not happening, even three years after the NAF’s Kevin Carey predicted it would. It’s more likely that prospective applicants are sensitive to whether graduate programs lead to jobs at the other end, not whether they can get free money today. Here’s law school applicants:
I’ve asserted elsewhere that the law-school applicant crunch has slowed because of articles blathering about how now is the best time ever to go to law school. IBR is a secondary concern, if at all. Really, it’s bizarre that anyone would think that applicants are sophisticated enough to base their decision to go to law school on the existence of IBR but shallow enough to overlook evidence suggesting that J.D.s do not lead to long-term professional careers.
Moving on, the NAF then appears to argue that the Obama administration is wrong to characterize IBR as an insurance policy against student-loan defaults because defaults are still increasing. The NAF says this is a “strange trend” even though it offers no reason to believe that savvy borrowers might be signing on to IBR instead of defaulting, while others haven’t received the message. Maybe both types of borrowers have low incomes and can’t otherwise repay their loans in full, but this assumption negates the NAF’s position that the economy is improving. Oh well.
Finally, the NAF worries that outstanding student loans are growing despite falling issuances because either (a) debtors’ incomes are alarmingly low, or (b) IBR is too generous. Again, only a few paragraphs earlier, the NAF cited the GAO study that found 80 percent of IBR enrollees earn $20,000 or less. Incredible. The ghoulish IBR deadbeat lives on.
So there you have it: In one post the NAF starts by arguing that more people should enroll in IBR to avoid default and then concludes that we should be troubled by … more people enrolling in IBR to avoid default. If it’s (a), then the problem is underemployment and low-wage jobs, not IBR; if it’s (b), then the problem is excessive government lending for unneeded education, not IBR.
That’s enough troll, I’m ready for turkey now. Enjoy your Thanksgiving, too.
Post-script: In case any of you were wondering, Congress can change or revoke IBR at any time because the Higher Education Act is incorporated by reference into student-loan promissory notes. Because the number of IBR variants is increasing, it’s probable that the government is hoping to simplify all of them into one that will probably not be so generous to graduate students as PAYE is. This is a compelling reason to stay away from grad school just because IBR is around. (More here.)