Original Research

LSAC Report Calls Into Question ‘Law-School Tipping Point’

One discovery I’m fond of is identifying the “law-school tipping point,” the moment when people with LSAT scores in hand decided to forgo law school entirely. I hypothesized that one could detect the tipping point by comparing over time the ratio of LSAT takers to subsequent applicants. Sure enough, the ratio spiked in the 2010 application cycle, which is the last applicant peak.

Here’s an updated version of the chart I created for that post:

(Source: LSAC (here for total LSATs and here (pdf) for first-time takers)

The arrow focuses on the pronounced gap between first-time LSAT takers in the 2009 calendar year and applicants for fall 2010. I took this as evidence of what I suspected had happened: Many people with LSAT scores in hand chose not to apply to law school the following year, presumably because they realized it was a really bad idea. In the three prior years, the ratio between first-time test takers and subsequent applicants was 1.08 on average. In 2010, it jumped to 1.19, accounting for 8,800 test takers who were not found in the 2010 application cycle. The ratio has since fallen to about 1.15 going forward.

The LSAC, however, recently published a report titled, “Analysis of LSAT Taker Application Behavior: Testing Years 2009-2010 Through 2015-2016” (pdf). It is an update of a similar report published in 2013, which I don’t recall seeing and cannot find, and it contains a table showing when test takers applied to law school.

Curiously, there’s scant evidence of a drop in test takers applying to law school, going by the first three columns of the table. People who took the LSAT between June 2009 and February 2010 pretty much all applied, save for 1 percent (~1,400 test takers). It doesn’t look like they delayed their applications either, which would cause them to appear in the rightward columns. (I don’t think the fact that I’m looking at calendar-year LSATs as opposed to June-February LSATs changes the results significantly.)

I have a hard time explaining the diverging results. It would certainly help to see previous years’ data, but my best hunch is that test-takers’ application behavior stayed the same while the frequency of their test-taking rose. In other words, perhaps many of these first-time takers simply retook the LSAT. As evidence, the LSAC report provides another figure (not shown) indicating that non-applicants tend to do very poorly on the LSAT, though they overlap with the low-end of applicants. These non-applicants may have doubled-down and chosen to retake the test again in 2010-11, and applied with whatever score they got then. Moreover, the ratio for second-time test takers to subsequent applicants (not shown) remained elevated after 2009-10 at about 0.42. Rather than walking away from the process potential applicants simply tried harder to beat the pack.

It’s a discouraging thought, but either hypothesis is valid at least to some degree until better information comes along. In the meantime, one thing the LSAC report teaches is that by and large people who do poorly on the LSAT are not as unsophisticated as they’re often portrayed. They tend to self-select by dropping out of the system. That doesn’t matter much to me since I care more about applicants, admits, and matriculants than LSAT takers, but whenever folks focus their attention on the smart people not applying to law school, just remember that many people who aren’t so good at standardized tests have been making the right choice all along.

Office of Management and Budget: +$725 Billion in Direct Loans by 2027

Every year in July the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) publishes its Mid-Session Review of the federal budget, which normally includes the Federal Direct Loan Program and projects its future. This year, the MSR (pdf) was only 22 pages because Director Mick Mulvaney said there were only “limited budget developments” since the administration released its misopauperous budget on May 23, 2016. So let’s take a look at that instead…

It’s titled, “A New Foundation for American Greatness.” My favorite part reading it thus far is the entry, “Invest in Cybersecurity,” which features an unspecified commitment.

Anyway, the budget has the Federal Direct Loan Program information we’re looking for, so back to that. The federal government’s direct loans consist primarily of student loans, but there are a few other programs in there as well. However, federal direct loans do not include private student loans, but these are a small percentage of all student loans. Thus, the OMB’s measure is both over- and under-inclusive of all student debt, but it covers most of it.

The OMB classifies direct loan accounts as financial assets net of liabilities totaling $1.227 trillion in 2016. According to the office’s projections, by 2027 this figure will grow to $1.952 trillion—59 percent.

(Source: Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2018 (pdf))

As with previous years, the current (2016) direct loan balance is below the OMB’s past projections, but not by much. For example, in FY2012, it predicted the balance would be $1.486 trillion by 2016, $259 billion (21 percent) higher than what actually occurred. Here are the OMB’s direct loan projections going back to FY2010.

Indeed, the most notable difference between His Emolumence’s OMB and Barack Obama’s is that it is now predicting far less student lending going forward. Total direct loans won’t even exceed $2 trillion. This, I think, is a more realistic assessment of where federal student lending is going. Whether this has something to do with the new administration or is standard practice for the OMB is outside of my knowledge base.

The OMB’s measure of direct loans is the net amount owed to the government, and the annual changes to that amount are not the same as the amount lent out each year to students. The Department of Education tracks its lending, which I discuss on the Student Deb Data page.

CLASS OF 2016 EMPLOYMENT REPORT (CORRECTED)

[I made a few unfortunately significant errors when I compiled the data and created the table for full-time, long-term, bar-passage-required outcomes by law school in my first post on this topic. I overlooked the fact that the ABA now separates school-funded jobs in its employment status breakdown, meaning I subtracted school-funded jobs needlessly. I also mis-sorted the employment data for the class of 2015. Rather than correct that post, I am reposting the data, along with the information from this morning’s “second cut” to keep it all in one place. I will keep the previous posts up but will replace their text with links redirecting readers to this site to preserve links to that information and comments.

I hate making these kinds of preventable mistakes, so I apologize to readers. However, I greatly appreciate those of you who reached out to me to notify me of the errors.]

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On Thursday, the ABA updated its Employment Summary Report Web site, which provides employment data for each law school class going back to 2010. Many if not all law schools have uploaded their individual reports, and some intrepid researchers have already dug into them, but I prefer to wait until the easy-to-use spreadsheet comes out. The ABA may revise these data over the next few months, but this first cut gives a good sense of the class of 2016’s employment outcomes. Also, completionists will note that while Indiana Tech graduated a small number of students last year, it did not report their employment outcomes. I exclude it.

36,618 people graduated from 200 ABA-accredited law schools outside of Puerto Rico roughly between September 1, 2015, and August 31, 2016. The employment information should be good as of about March 15, 2017.

Here’s the pie chart of the employment status distribution.

I’ll analyze these numbers in more depth in my second cut, but overall the percentages look slightly better than last year. However, even though there are fewer graduates (down 15 percent from two years ago) the proportion obtaining work hasn’t risen dramatically.

More tables appear below the fold to conserve blog space.

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W&S Lawyer Employment Grows Trivially in 2016, Incomes Still Flat

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) usually completes its updates of its many measures of occupational employment for the previous year by April. Data for 2016 are now available, allowing a comprehensive summary of lawyer employment for that year. For detailed discussion of what the BLS datasets are and how they address lawyer employment, I recommend the lawyer overproduction page [updated!].

For context, according to the Current Population Survey (CPS), the number of people who reported working as lawyers in 2016 shrank 2.3 percent to 1,133,000—about where it was in 2014. The CPS also estimated 745,000 people working as lawyers on a wage or salary basis, a 7.2 percent decline from the previous year (-58,000 lawyers). This change is plausible because in 2015, the number rose 9 percent (+66,000) and could just indicate measurement problems with the CPS. By contrast, the more accurate Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program found that the number of wage-and-salary lawyers grew by 1.6 percent last year to 619,530 (+9,600 lawyers). The number of employee lawyers in the legal sector grew only a negligible 0.7 percent to 382,730 (+2,550).

Employee lawyers’ incomes were flat again in 2016. The OES estimated a scant 0.7 percent median hourly wage growth, although the CPS registered a -0.7 percent median weekly wage increase. Going by the OES, the last peak for lawyers’ earnings was 2009 (~$125,000 annually); incomes are about 6.7 percent lower (-$8,400) in real dollars since then. Here is an annualized dispersion.

These lawyer employment and income measures are not strong bellwethers for the value of legal education because they include many established lawyers and don’t measure recent graduate outcomes particularly well, especially those of graduates who do not promptly start careers in law. Readers seeking insight into that topic are instead advised to look at my criteria for predicting improvements in law graduate outcomes and the lawyer production page for a clear discussion of the BLS’s Employment Projections program.

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Prior versions of this post:

Which Law Schools Are Shedding Full-Time Faculty? (2016 Edition)

Facing shrinking enrollments, many law schools have responded by cutting their faculties. The phenomenon is worth measuring because faculty reductions aren’t always announced publicly, often appearing in the guises of retirements and quiet buy-outs. Consequently, the ABA’s 509 information reports can shed light on changes in law-school faculties. Here’s the cumulative distribution through 2016.

no-law-school-faculty-by-type

As with previous years, I will estimate the decline in fall full-time law-school faculties among the 201 law schools that aren’t in Puerto Rico. Note, however, that it’s unclear whether the term “full-time faculty” used in the 509 information reports includes full-time employees of a law school (as defined by the ABA’s annual questionnaire) who are on leave but have a right to return. Past editions of the Official Guide explicitly excluded full-time faculty who were on leave or sabbatical from their two-page spreads, which now exist as the online 509 information reports. The “Guide to the Data” pdf file accompanying the 509 information reports doesn’t specify either.

I assume the ABA is continuing to exclude faculty on leave or sabbatical and only counts faculty teaching courses in the fall or spring terms, even though it isn’t clear. Consequently, minor fluctuations might mean even less than I thought before, and although I’m obviously aware more faculty teach in the spring, I choose to track fall full-time faculty because the figures represent more recent developments. Additionally, full-time faculty who have shifted to the category “deans, librarians, and others who teach” are excluded as well. This may explain why there are fewer full-time faculty in the fall than spring as full-timers teach most of their courses then.

The peak for fall full timers occurred in 2010 (9,093), but that estimate includes the “other full-time faculty” category (clinicians and legal-writing instructors, if I recall), which the ABA no longer tracks independently. Fall full-time faculty fell by 3.3 percent this year (-261). Last year the decline was 3.4 percent (-242), so things are smoothing out. Since 2010, the cumulative decline has been 16.1 percent.

Here is a table of law schools ranked by net change in full-time faculty since 2010 and smallest faculty size in 2010. Trivial annual changes may not represent staff reductions and might be attributable to other factors, as discussed above. This year I’m choosing not to rank law schools that have merged, split, or didn’t exist in 2010 to prevent distortions.

FULL-TIME FACULTY (FALL)
RANK SCHOOL ’10 ’15 ’16 ANNUAL CHANGE NET CHANGE
1. WMU Cooley 101 44 41 -3 -60
N/A Rutgers-Camden 54 36 -36 -54
2. American 104 91 52 -39 -52
3. John Marshall (Chicago) 75 45 27 -18 -48
4. Florida Coastal 69 37 24 -13 -45
N/A Rutgers-Newark 40 37 -37 -40
N/A Penn State (Dickinson Law) 57 19 18 -1 -39
5. George Washington 106 70 69 -1 -37
N/A Hamline 34 10 -10 -34
N/A William Mitchell 34 22 -22 -34
6. St. Louis 65 45 34 -11 -31
7. Catholic 56 32 27 -5 -29
8. Seton Hall 59 37 32 -5 -27
8. Vermont 55 27 28 1 -27
8. Seattle 66 47 39 -8 -27
11. Widener (Delaware) 50 31 24 -7 -26
11. New York Law School 71 48 45 -3 -26
13. Pacific, McGeorge 63 34 39 5 -24
14. Pace 47 30 25 -5 -22
14. Cleveland State 39 19 17 -2 -22
16. Santa Clara 65 45 44 -1 -21
16. DePaul 56 32 35 3 -21
16. Hofstra 60 34 39 5 -21
19. Nova Southeastern 60 48 40 -8 -20
19. New England 40 26 20 -6 -20
21. Golden Gate 42 25 23 -2 -19
21. Texas 103 80 84 4 -19
23. California-Berkeley 90 68 72 4 -18
23. Stetson 59 45 41 -4 -18
23. Valparaiso 35 30 17 -13 -18
23. Suffolk 80 61 62 1 -18
23. Western New England 36 18 18 0 -18
23. Capital 35 23 17 -6 -18
23. Wisconsin 65 55 47 -8 -18
30. California Western 45 35 28 -7 -17
30. Boston University 67 50 50 0 -17
30. Detroit Mercy 42 25 25 0 -17
30. Syracuse 60 37 43 6 -17
30. Charleston 31 16 14 -2 -17
35. Chapman 51 40 35 -5 -16
35. Atlanta’s John Marshall 35 22 19 -3 -16
35. Albany 46 28 30 2 -16
35. Lewis and Clark 53 40 37 -3 -16
35. Villanova 49 31 33 2 -16
35. Houston 76 61 60 -1 -16
41. Arizona Summit [Phoenix] 32 7 17 10 -15
41. Hawaii 35 30 20 -10 -15
41. Fordham 81 65 66 1 -15
44. Louisiana State 41 30 27 -3 -14
44. Maryland 63 49 49 0 -14
44. St. John’s 50 37 36 -1 -14
44. Oklahoma City 34 22 20 -2 -14
48. Arizona 44 32 31 -1 -13
48. Arkansas (Little Rock) 30 21 17 -4 -13
48. Loyola (CA) 66 57 53 -4 -13
48. Thomas Jefferson 42 35 29 -6 -13
48. Whittier 31 31 18 -13 -13
48. Dayton 27 16 14 -2 -13
48. Regent 25 10 12 2 -13
55. Miami 82 72 70 -2 -12
55. SUNY Buffalo 54 27 42 15 -12
55. Touro 42 31 30 -1 -12
55. North Carolina Central 42 31 30 -1 -12
55. Akron 33 22 21 -1 -12
55. Widener (Commonwealth) 25 14 13 -1 -12
55. Marquette 39 27 27 0 -12
62. Faulkner 23 12 12 0 -11
62. Georgia 51 40 40 0 -11
62. Illinois 49 43 38 -5 -11
62. Loyola (IL) 60 51 49 -2 -11
62. Southern University 35 25 24 -1 -11
62. Tulsa 28 22 17 -5 -11
62. Roger Williams 27 14 16 2 -11
62. Gonzaga 29 21 18 -3 -11
70. La Verne 19 10 9 -1 -10
70. Connecticut 52 44 42 -2 -10
70. Quinnipiac 32 20 22 2 -10
70. Ave Maria 26 20 16 -4 -10
70. Loyola (LA) 50 42 40 -2 -10
75. San Diego 66 53 57 4 -9
75. Florida State 47 39 38 -1 -9
75. Iowa 46 34 37 3 -9
75. Kansas 35 30 26 -4 -9
75. Tulane 53 40 44 4 -9
75. Mississippi College 26 24 17 -7 -9
75. Campbell 23 17 14 -3 -9
75. Temple 63 60 54 -6 -9
75. Southern Methodist 46 37 37 0 -9
75. Appalachian 16 7 7 0 -9
85. Northern Kentucky 28 24 20 -4 -8
85. New Hampshire 33 28 25 -3 -8
85. Brooklyn 68 60 60 0 -8
85. Ohio Northern 22 12 14 2 -8
85. Oregon 35 29 27 -2 -8
90. Indiana (Bloomington) 59 52 52 0 -7
90. Indiana (Indianapolis) 41 34 34 0 -7
90. Boston College 51 50 44 -6 -7
90. Case Western Reserve 47 41 40 -1 -7
94. Alabama 47 40 41 1 -6
94. California-Hastings 71 59 65 6 -6
94. Southwestern 57 56 51 -5 -6
94. Washburn 31 27 25 -2 -6
94. Baltimore 58 58 52 -6 -6
94. Pittsburgh 47 43 41 -2 -6
94. Washington and Lee 35 26 29 3 -6
101. Southern California 43 39 38 -1 -5
101. Mercer 27 26 22 -4 -5
101. Chicago-Kent, IIT 66 65 61 -4 -5
101. Minnesota 58 57 53 -4 -5
101. St. Thomas (MN) 29 24 24 0 -5
101. Mississippi 31 25 26 1 -5
101. Montana 19 13 14 1 -5
101. Wake Forest 48 38 43 5 -5
101. Tennessee 30 28 25 -3 -5
101. Texas Tech 35 30 30 0 -5
111. District of Columbia 21 18 17 -1 -4
111. Barry 33 34 29 -5 -4
111. Florida International 32 29 28 -1 -4
111. Louisville 26 21 22 1 -4
111. Missouri (Kansas City) 34 33 30 -3 -4
111. Washington University 68 63 64 1 -4
111. Pennsylvania 75 75 71 -4 -4
111. Texas A&M [Wesleyan] 30 30 26 -4 -4
119. Arizona State 53 49 50 1 -3
119. Arkansas (Fayetteville) 29 29 26 -3 -3
119. San Francisco 37 33 34 1 -3
119. Southern Illinois 27 22 24 2 -3
119. Drake 28 26 25 -1 -3
119. Wayne State 38 39 35 -4 -3
119. Toledo 26 20 23 3 -3
119. Duquesne 26 26 23 -3 -3
119. South Texas 44 41 41 0 -3
128. Samford 23 21 21 0 -2
128. Pepperdine 35 35 33 -2 -2
128. Florida A&M 35 20 33 13 -2
128. Kentucky 25 23 23 0 -2
128. Cincinnati 29 27 27 0 -2
128. Oklahoma 34 31 32 1 -2
128. South Dakota 14 11 12 1 -2
128. Utah 34 32 32 0 -2
128. George Mason 38 34 36 2 -2
128. Wyoming 21 22 19 -3 -2
138. California-Los Angeles 86 86 85 -1 -1
138. Michigan State 52 50 51 1 -1
138. New Mexico 28 29 27 -2 -1
138. Cardozo, Yeshiva 61 69 60 -9 -1
138. Willamette 28 26 27 1 -1
138. Vanderbilt 36 38 35 -3 -1
138. Washington 54 65 53 -12 -1
145. Creighton 23 25 23 -2 0
145. Nevada 26 27 26 -1 0
145. City University 36 37 36 -1 0
145. South Carolina 36 36 36 0 0
149. California-Davis 43 43 44 1 1
149. Western State 16 17 17 0 1
149. Howard 26 25 27 2 1
149. St. Thomas (FL) 28 30 29 -1 1
149. Notre Dame 46 47 47 0 1
149. Nebraska 26 27 27 0 1
149. Charlotte 35 48 36 -12 1
149. Duke 70 76 71 -5 1
149. North Dakota 12 15 13 -2 1
149. Baylor 27 25 28 3 1
149. Liberty 19 20 20 0 1
149. Virginia 79 80 80 0 1
161. Georgia State 57 59 59 0 2
161. Harvard 141 154 143 -11 2
161. Northeastern 36 41 38 -3 2
161. Elon 20 22 22 0 2
161. William and Mary 39 44 41 -3 2
161. West Virginia 33 34 35 1 2
167. Colorado 43 48 46 -2 3
167. Chicago 71 67 74 7 3
167. Northern Illinois 19 21 22 1 3
167. Maine 16 19 19 0 3
167. New York University 151 153 154 1 3
167. Drexel 27 27 30 3 3
167. St. Mary’s 36 29 39 10 3
174. Yale 76 71 80 9 4
174. Emory 58 68 62 -6 4
174. Missouri (Columbia) 28 30 32 2 4
174. North Carolina 42 49 46 -3 4
174. Memphis 18 22 22 0 4
174. Richmond 36 35 40 5 4
180. Idaho 21 25 26 1 5
N/A Indiana Tech 7 5 -2 5
180. Michigan 92 90 97 7 5
180. Texas Southern 30 29 35 6 5
183. Cornell 51 63 57 -6 6
183. Ohio State 42 46 48 2 6
N/A Concordia 10 8 -2 8
N/A Lincoln Memorial 9 8 -1 8
185. Brigham Young 19 27 27 0 8
186. Denver 62 69 71 2 9
187. Florida 56 68 66 -2 10
188. Georgetown 129 128 140 12 11
188. Northwestern 99 104 110 6 11
N/A Belmont 13 13 0 13
N/A Belmont 13 13 0 13
N/A Massachusetts — Dartmouth 15 14 -1 14
190. Stanford 68 91 88 -3 20
N/A Penn State (Penn State Law) 35 31 -4 31
N/A California-Irvine 35 38 3 38
N/A Mitchell|Hamline 38 38 38
191. Columbia 107 161 153 -8 46
N/A Rutgers 76 76 76
10TH PERCENTILE 23 17 17 -7 -22
25TH PERCENTILE 30 25 23 -4 -14
MEDIAN 42 33 32 -1 -6
75TH PERCENTILE 58 48 45 1 1
90TH PERCENTILE 75 68 66 4 5
MEAN 46.4 38.9 38.0 -1.3 -7.1
GROSS GAIN (^-^) 321 442
GROSS LOSS -582 -1,902
CUMULATIVE 9,093 7,894 7,633 -261 -1,460

Editorial observations:

  • WMU Cooley retains its crown as number one.
  • No. 2, American, appears to have lost 43 percent of its fall full-time faculty this year—half since 2010. This may be a misreporting by the law school.
  • The same goes for number three, John Marshall. It’s lost nearly two-thirds of its faculty since 2010.
  • I’m less surprised to see Florida Coastal next on the list.
  • No. 5, George Washington, raised a stir in 2015 because, as some commenters insisted, the law school reclassified a number of full-time faculty to a designation none could identify. It’s possible that the elimination of the “other full-time faculty” category somehow disserved GWU, but I don’t really see why because similar problems didn’t plague other law schools at the time. As it is, until someone can identify which bucket GWU put those twenty or so persons, it keeps its high place.
  • Whittier lost 13 full-time faculty this year, but it had gained 10 last year. Similarly, SUNY Buffalo lost 24 last year but gained 15 this year. Again, probably erratic reporting.
  • A bunch of law schools lost more than 10 full-time faculty this year that I haven’t already mentioned: Valparaiso (-13), University of Washington (-12), Charlotte (-12), St. Louis (-11), and Harvard (-11). Of these, Charlotte lost 16 last year, and Harvard gained 15 last year.
  • Arizona Summit gained back ten, and it did report part-time faculty this year. Last year it didn’t, which was clearly wrong.
  • Finally, five law schools are running with fewer than ten fall full-time faculty, La Verne (9), Lincoln Memorial (8), Concordia (8), Appalachian (7), and the doomed Indiana Tech (5).

Here are prior posts on this topic:

2016: Full-Time Private Law School Tuition Up 2.7 Percent

Full-time tuition costs at private law schools rose an average 2.7 percent before adjusting for inflation. The rate is about 1 percent higher than the last two years’ increases, but it’s still below the typical 5 percent rate before the Great Recession. I focus on private law-school tuition because public law schools receive varying degrees of state subsidies, so they do not reflect the already distorted legal market’s prices.

Here’s what the dispersion of full-time private and full-time public (residential) tuition looks like going back to 1996:

full-time-law-school-tuition-dispersion-excl-p-r-constant

I don’t have much to say about this that I haven’t before, but it appears that the 25th percentile public law school will soon charge more than the Stafford loan limit, which has been set at $20,500 for several years now. The limit is important because it indicates when students will need to rely on other funds to pay for their legal educations, including Grad PLUS loans, which can also go to students’ living expenses. Since 1996, Stafford loans have lost about a third of their value to inflation.

Notably costs are still widening, so after chopping up the law schools into quintiles, here’s the increases for the mean of each quintile.

full-time-private-law-school-tuition-increases-by-tuition-quintile-mean-current

The chart depicts at least three straight years of top-heavy tuition increases: The more expensive law schools are becoming more expensive—4 percent more among the top 20 percent of law schools. Two years ago, Columbia Law School became the first to charge more than $60,000, and it now costs more than $65,000. This year six other law schools joined the 60k club: NYU, Cornell, Penn, Chicago, Harvard, and USC. These seven schools raised their full-time costs by 3.8 percent on average, but theirs weren’t the largest increases. The following nine law schools raised their full-time tuition by more than 5 percent: Loyola (Calif.) (+5.4%), Michigan State (+5.5%), WMU Cooley (+6.1%), Faulkner (+6.6%), Lincoln Memorial (+6.8%), Tulsa (+7.0%), Charlotte (+7.1%), Willamette (+9.6%), and Howard (+10.9%).

It would be unfair of me not to acknowledge the handful of private law schools that cut their full-time charges: Campbell (-0.4%), Capital (-5.2%), Dayton (-6.4%), and Indiana Tech (-31.1%). Fourteen private law schools held their costs flat: New York Law School, Chicago-Kent, Brooklyn, Suffolk, Loyola (La.), Western State, Ave Maria, Western New England, Detroit, Valparaiso, Barry, Oklahoma City, Mississippi College, and Elon.

Yes, I notice that two failing law schools, Indiana Tech and Charlotte, both dealt with their incipient problems by slashing and hiking costs, respectively. For Indiana Tech, it didn’t translate into more matriculants.

Finally, 19 public law schools cut or held their residential tuition with the two most notable ones being Texas A&M (-15.4%) and UC Hastings (-9.1%). Akron, Cincinnati, and Toledo also didn’t raise their tuition, so along with Capital and Dayton that makes five of nine Ohio law schools that stand out in tuition control.

Full-time tuition costs don’t necessarily indicate what students are actually charged, but they do show how much rent law schools can extract from the government’s loan programs. For many law schools that ability is fading.

Information on this topic from prior years: